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Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker
Thy husband is thy lord, thy life, thy keeper,
Thy head, thy sovereign; one that cares for thee,
And for thy maintenance commits his body
To painful labour both by sea and land,
To watch the night in storms, the day in cold,
Whilst thou liest warm at home, secure and safe,
And craves no other tribute at thy hands
But love, fair looks and true obedience;
Too little payment for so great a debt.'
Katherine in The Taming of the Shrew.
I felt a warm little glow under my rib cage. Someone thought I was a
competent human being, not a pain in the butt who should mind her
own business . . .. [I]t just felt good to have someone-some
man-call up and think first that I should be working, not that I
should stay home and play with dolls.'
V.I. Warshawski in Burn Marks.
Wifely submission is risky business in the 1990s. Gone is the
day when a wife could depend on her husband's labor to maintain
her at home, "secure and safe." Today is the day of divorce at will
and equality rhetoric, which means that if her marriage ends, the
homemaking wife' will be catapulted into financial independence,
1 William Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew, V:ii:151, in The Complete Works
59-60 (Oxford, 1986).
2 Sara Paretsky, Burn Marks 117 (Delacorte, 1990).
3 Throughout this Article, a homemaker is presumed to be female. The Bureau of La-
bor Statistics reported that in 1991, a total of 41.8 million women (married or unmarried)
stayed out of the labor force for various reasons. Approximately 22.7 million of them did not
want a job because they were "keeping house." An additional 1.2 million wanted a job, but
did not look for one because of "home responsibility." By contrast, only 415,000 men stayed
out of the labor force to "keep house," and only a "small number" did not look for work
because of "home responsibility." Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Dept of Labor,
39 Employment and Earnings, No 1 at 204, Table 35 (1992) ("Bureau of Labor Statistics").
See also National Displaced Homemakers Network, The More Things Change... A Status
Report on Displaced Homemakers and Single Parents in the 1980s 59 (1990) (on file with
U Chi L Rev) ("Status Report (1990)").
Based on similar 1983 statistics, Dean Marilyn Yarbrough concluded that a woman is
100 times more likely to be a displaced homemaker than a man. Marilyn Yarbrough, Dispa-
rate Impact, Disparate Treatment, and the Displaced Homemaker, 49 L & Contemp
Probs, No 4 at 107, 119 (1986). For a definition of displaced homemaker, see note 7. Even
when a woman works outside the home, she is likely to undertake a disproportionately large
share of homemaking chores. See note 11 and accompanying text.
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and probably financial ruin. Such is the 1990s price tag for choos-
ing to "play with dolls."'4
This is not good news for approximately sixteen million mar-
ried women who are not employed outside their homes because
they are "keeping house."'5 Seriously at risk are the heroines of the
Betty Crocker culture, women who have already devoted their
most career-productive years to homemaking and who, if forced
into the labor market after divorce, suddenly will be viewed as
modern dinosaurs. Non-wage-earning mothers of young children
and many wage-earning wives whose responsibilities as primary
caretakers limit their career choice and advancement face similar
risks. If their marriages end, these women may learn the true
meaning of "the divorce revolution"6 as they are judged by divorce
courts determined to implement the fashionable rhetoric that men
and women are equal. Startling inequities have resulted, as judges
ignore the realities of scant property and limited earning potential
and adopt the legislative assumption that homemakers need mini-
mal, if any, maintenance. The broad discretion vested in these
judges then insulates each of their idiosyncratic decisions from
meaningful appellate review. Homemakers whose divorces are not
litigated are equally hard-hit as they negotiate or mediate within
this disastrous judicial and legislative framework.
The few courts and legislatures that have acknowledged this
situation have often responded in only a timid and tentative fash-
ion. Concerned legal commentators have launched a bolder search
for a theoretical basis for maintenance, which the clean-break phi-
losophy of no-fault does not provide. This search has contributed
to the American Law Institute's recent decision to draft a set of
principles to guide family law. The Institute's work makes timely
this examination of the problem.
4 See Barbara Stark, Divorce Law, Feminism, and Psychoanalysis: In Dreams Begin
Responsibilities, 38 UCLA L Rev 1483, 1522 (1991) (little girls practice their role as nur-
turer through interminable play with dolls).
" Of 51.5 million wives in the United States in December, 1991, a total of 21 million
were not in the labor force for various reasons. Approximately 16 million wives were not in
the labor force because they were "keeping house." Bureau of Labor Statistics at 26 (cited
in note 3).
' See generally Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution (Free Press, 1985).
[60:67
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No-fault divorce laws are not alone responsible for the im-
poverishment of displaced homemakers. 7 No-fault did not create
the sex/gender system.8 Nor is no-fault responsible for the depreci-
ation in marketable human capital that ordinarily accompanies
homemaking. No-fault, however, exacerbates the effects of these
factors by making divorce easier to obtain,9 thus increasing the
number of women who lose their male buffer when they are finan-
cially vulnerable. Although the roots of this problem can be traced
to the sex/gender system, elimination of that system is too slow a
solution for the displaced homemaker. Her urgent problem de-
mands a swift response.
In this Article, I advocate divorce law reform as an immediate
response that will both ease current suffering and encourage future
relaxation of gender roles. My proposal models marriage after con-
temporary partnership law, reconceptualizes divorce, and adopts a
new vocabulary, suggested by recent drafts of the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act. Under this contemporary partnership model, di-
vorce occurs when a spouse dissociates from the relationship before
7 Laurie Shields credits Tish Sommers with coining the term "displaced homemaker"
in 1974. Laurie Shields, Displaced Homemakers: Organizing For A New Life ix (McGraw-
Hill, 1981). The following definition appears in the Displaced Homemakers Self-Sufficiency
Assistance Act ("DHSSAA"), Pub L No 101-554, § 3(3), 104 Stat 2751 (1991), codified at 29
USCA § 2302(3) (West Supp 1991):
(3) The term "displaced homemaker" means an individual who has been providing un-
paid services to family members in the home and who-
(A) has been dependent either-
(i) on public assistance and whose youngest child is within 2 years of losing eligi-
bility under part A of title IV of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 601 et seq.], or
(ii) on the income of another family member but is no longer supported by that
income, and
(B) is unemployed or underemployed and experiencing difficulty obtaining or upgrad-
ing employment.
8 This system is described in Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the "Polit-
ical Economy" of Sex, in Rayna R. Reiter, ed, Toward an Anthropology of Women 157, 168
(Monthly Review Press, 1975). Barbara Stark discusses the impact of the sex/gender system
on the law of divorce in her helpful article. See Stark, 38 UCLA L Rev at 1494-1503 (cited
in note 4).
1 The ease with which a husband may dispose of his aging wife under no-fault is color-
fully criticized in In re Marriage of Branter, 67 Cal App 3d 416, 136 Cal Rptr 635, 637
(1977):
A woman is not a breeding cow to be nurtured during her years of fecundity, then
conveniently and economically converted to cheap steaks when past her prime ....
This has nothing to do with feminism, sexism, male chauvinism, or any other
trendy social ideology. It is ordinary common sense, basic decency and simple justice.
Contrary to Judge Gardner's suggestion, the financial devastation of homemakers under no-
fault is very much a feminist issue, since homemakers are almost always women. See note 3
and accompanying text.
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expiration of the term. Dissociation triggers the equal division of
traditional marital property. In addition, a dissociated spouse re-
ceives the right to a buyout of her interest in any income-generat-
ing marital enterprise that continues after dissociation. Such a
marital enterprise continues when the enhanced human capital of
either spouse, attributable to education or labor force participation
during marriage, generates income after divorce.
To implement this model and to guard against its gender-bi-
•ased application, I propose bright-line legislation that presump-
tively establishes (1) a simple mathematical model for calculating
enhanced earnings, and (2) a sliding scale that bases the buyout
price on the length of the marriage. This model will usually require
a husband who earns higher wages to pay maintenance to a wife
whose primary caretaking responsibilities have precluded or lim-
ited her career choice and advancement.
I. THE PROBLEM
The home is not an equal-opportunity employer. Even though
there is "no 'nurturing' hormone produced along with mother's
milk [and] no 'nurturing' gene located in the extra X chromo-
some,"' 0 homemaking is women's work."
Though underpaid, homemaking is not necessarily a useless or
unsatisfying occupation. Homemaking is family-specific caretaking
that provides a supportive, connected, non-distracting environ-
Stark, 38 UCLA L Rev at 1498 (cited in note 4).
1 See note 3. A large proportion of married women who work outside the home assume
primary caretaking responsibilities. Bureau of the Census, United States Dept of Commerce,
Women in the American Economy, Series P-23, No 146 at 7 (1986). The Bureau reported
that "[m]any [wage-earning women] choose work that will fit around ... their family re-
sponsibilities, a complication and impediment to occupational advancement not faced by
most men." Id. Professor Deborah Rhode has reported that women remain responsible for
approximately 70% of the housework and working wives spend twice as much time on
homemaking tasks as working husbands. Deborah L. Rhode, Justice and Gender: Sex Dis-
crimination and the Law 174 (Harvard, 1989) (citing representative studies). Only one hus-
band in twenty makes the bed in which he sleeps. Id. Susan Faludi suggests that the only
major change in the last fifteen years is that now middle class men think they do more
around the house. Susan Faludi, Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Women
xiv (Doubleday, 1991) (citing a national poll reporting that the ranks of women saying their
husbands share in child care shrunk to 31% in 1987 from 40% three years earlier). Over
50% of wage-earning women have reported dropping out of the labor force for family rea-
sons, as compared to 1% of wage-earning men. Id. See generally Arlie Hochschild and Anne
Machung, The Second Shift: Working Parents and the Revolution at Home (Viking, 1989).
As a practical matter, one need only tune in to daytime television commercials to see who
cleans the bathrooms.
[60:67
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ment that nurtures family members, including the caretaker,12
and encourages maximization of a wage-earner's human capital.
Caretaking, however, takes time. As a consequence, these responsi-
bilities often limit a caretaker's career choice and advancement,
thus perpetuating the sexual division of labor in the marketplace.
The reality that homemaking is both gender-specific and ca-
reer-costly clashes with the rhetoric of equality underpinning no-
fault divorce laws, which supposes that if spouses receive equal
treatment and a clean break on divorce they will begin new lives
on an equal footing."3 This clash between reality and rhetoric has
produced an American tragedy in the forum of divorce, where
homemakers repeatedly face the financial slaughter of equal treat-
ment without equal opportunity. To understand the roots of this
tragedy, and to avoid a blame-the-victim perspective, one must
first examine the traditional role of women under the sex/gender
system.
A. The Role-Kinder, Kiche, Kirche1 4
In American culture, women have long occupied the private
sphere of home and family, while men have occupied the public
sphere of the marketplace.1 5 According to the traditional stereo-
type, a woman's primary role is to care for home and family; a
"real woman" would never forsake this role for a career.1' The fact
that most women today, even if they are full-time wage earners,
continue to assume primary caretaking responsibilities, evidences
12 Recent studies have suggested, however, that homemaking may disproportionately
benefit family members. See Faludi, Backlash at 37 (cited in note 11) (reporting that mar-
ried women run a higher risk than single women of developing mental and physical ail-
ments, while husbands of homemakers have less psychological distress and higher self-es-
teem than husbands of working women).
"S For a general discussion of the clash between equality rhetoric and the economics of
divorce, see Martha Albertson Fineman, The Illusion of Equality: The Rhetoric and Reality
of Divorce Reform (Chicago, 1991).
1" Literally, "children, kitchen, church." This German phrase suggests that women
should be confined to their biological role.
I" For an infamous judicial comment on the public/private sphere dichotomy, see
Bradwell v Illinois, 83 US (16 Wall) 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley concurring) (a married
woman has no right to practice law because "the civil law, as well as nature herself, has
always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and wo-
man .... [T]he domestic sphere . . .properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood"). For a discussion of these separate spheres in legal thought, see Rhode, Jus-
tice and Gender at 38-50 (cited in note 11).
16 Anthropologist Margaret Mead suggested that a female has two choices: either she
proclaims herself "a woman, and therefore less an achieving individual, or an achieving indi-
vidual and therefore less a woman." William H. Chafe, Women and Equality 15 (Oxford,
1977).
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the tenacity of this stereotype. Its essence, however, must be ex-
plored by looking to a time when it was more openly expressed; for
instance, the 1950s.17
The view that homemaking is properly women's work was
trumpeted in startlingly frank fashion in the 1950s. A woman's
"central function," observed one sociologist of the day, "remains
that of creating a life style for herself and for the home in which
she is life creator and life sustainer." I A homemaker, chimed the
popular press, is a "wondrous creature [who] marries younger than
ever, bears more babies and looks and acts far more feminine than
the 'emancipated' girl of the 1920's or even '30's. Steelworker's wife
and Junior Leaguer alike do their own housework .... Today, if
she makes an old-fashioned choice and lovingly tends a garden and
a bumper crop of children, she rates louder hosannas than ever
before."' 9 Such housewives were openly applauded as "feminine,
women with truly feminine attitudes, admired by men for their mi-
raculous, God-given, sensationally unique ability to wear skirts,
with all the implications of that fact."20
The marketplace duplicated this view of the proper role of
women, exhibiting an "almost universal opposition to employment
of middle-class married women."' 21 Most married women did not
work outside their homes.22 Those who entered the labor force did
so "as a way of filling a hope chest or buying a new home freezer
[while] gracefully conced[ing] the top jobs to men. '23 Such women
took jobs not "out of a desire to compete with men but rather to
help the family-a traditional role. '24 Not surprisingly, the major-
ity of wage-earning women were segregated in low-paying jobs.25
17 Susan Faludi has identified several periods in American history when the homemak-
ing virtues were openly trumpeted as part of a backlash against female independence. See
Faludi, Backlash at 48 (cited in note 11).
'" Max Lerner, America as a Civilization 611 (Simon and Schuster, 1957).
19 Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique 59 (Norton, 1963), quoting from Look maga-
zine (Oct 16, 1956).
20 Id, quoting from Life magazine, (Christmas 1956).
21 Chafe, Women and Equality at 32 (cited in note 16). Professor Chafe explains that
being able to provide for a wife at home signified middle class status. A wife's employment
cast doubt on her husband's ability to provide for his family. Id.
22 Professor Chafe reported that in 1940, only 15% of all married women were in the
labor force. By the end of the 1960s, this number had reached 45%. Id at 95.
23 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique at 59 (cited in note 19), quoting from Look maga-
zine (Oct 16, 1956).
24 Chafe, Women and Equality at 95 (cited in note 16).
'5 In 1950, female wages were 53% of male wages. Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work
381 n 26 (Oxford, 1982). Recently, wages of white women have been reported to be 63% of
[60:67
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Women who, by force of spirit, resisted the cultural norm and
pursued a career rather than a home freezer were generally viewed
as "neurotic, unfeminine, unhappy women." 6 As one popular mag-
azine explained, "Few women would want to thumb their noses at
husbands, children and community and go off on their own. Those
who do may be talented individuals, but they rarely are successful
women." 27 In the words of a New York Times editorial, while some
housewives "admit to being deeply frustrated at times by the lack
of privacy, the physical burden, the routine of family life, the con-
finement of it, [ ] none would give up her home and family if she
had the choice to make again. '28 "Real" women knew their
priorities.
The demise of full-time homemaking as a grandly trumpeted
cultural norm should not delude us into thinking that it never held
that status. Many women in divorce courts today decided to devote
their lives to homemaking when that role was the only "proper"
one for a married woman. Judgment by the forgetful is a danger-
ous process indeed.
Nor should the lack of open advocacy of the homemaking vir-
tues lure us into thinking that such views are merely remnants of
the past. Caretaking is still largely a female role. While many mar-
ried women today work outside their homes, approximately sixteen
million stay out of the labor force because they are "keeping
house. 1 9 Moreover, most women who work in the marketplace
continue to assume primary caretaking responsibilities that limit
their occupational choice and advancement. In this respect, many
contemporary wives do not differ much from the wives of the 1950s
who openly worked for "pin money" and whose priorities were
more widely applauded.30
white men's wages. Natl Committee on Pay Equity, Pay Equity: An Issue of Race, Ethnic-
ity and Sex 1 (1987), citing US Census Bureau statistics for 1985.
" Friedan, The Feminine Mystique at 16 (cited in note 19). See also Chafe, Women
and Equality at 94 (cited in note 16). One psychiatrist wrote that any mother who worked
was "stimulated by neurotic competition." Id.
'7 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique at 25 (cited in note 19), quoting from Redbook
magazine.
28 Id, quoting from The New York Times.
" See notes 3 and 11.
30 Indeed, in her 1981 account of the effects of the "Cinderella Complex" on women's
employment, Colette Dowling observed:
This need for, and attachment to, "the other" inhibits in all kinds of ways women's
capacity to work Productively-to be original, zestful, and committed. The myth that
our salvation lies in attachment carries with it the hidden corollary that we will not be
required to work forever. When suddenly something happens that makes working a
19931
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In at least one respect, however, the position of contemporary
wives differs dramatically from the position of wives of the 1950s.
Implicit in the cultural message of the 1950s that a woman's
proper role is to care for home and family was the predicate that
her home and family would be there for her. Divorce was rare,3
and the conventional wisdom was that if a woman divorced, her
husband would continue to support her through alimony pay-
ments.2 Restricting a husband's access to divorce insulated the
homemaker against the depreciation in marketable human capital
that ordinarily accompanies homemaking. No-fault divorce, how-
ever, removed this insulation.
B. The "Liberation"-"Equality" for the Homemaker
In the 1960s and 1970s, traditional reverence for marriage and
the family began to decline. Although the cultural message of the
1950s continued to channel women into homemaking, the virtues
of that role were no longer so openly trumpeted. The new cultural
necessity, many become inflamed with a fierce inner rage. To have to work is a sign,
somehow, that they have failed as women.
Collette Dowling, The Cinderella Complex 55 (Summit, 1981).
" Except for a brief period after World War II, divorce increased only gradually from
1860 to the early 1960s. See Weitzman, Divorce Revolution at xvii (cited in note 6). See also
Mary E. O'Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 23 New
England L Rev 437, 478 & n 236 (1988) (noting a steadily increasing divorce rate from 1860
to 1946, when it peaked at three times the 1933 rate).
Between 1950 and 1964, the divorce rate remained at between 8.9 and 10.3 per 1,000
women age 15 years and older. By 1970, this rate had increased to 14.9, and by 1987 it had
risen to 20.8. United States Department of Health and Human Services, 3 Vital Statistics of
the United States: Marriage and Divorce 2-5, Table 2-1 (1991).
32 See generally, Homer H. Clark, Jr., 1 The Law of Domestic Relations in the United
States 220-21 (West, 2d ed 1987). See also Note, Property Division and Alimony Awards: A
Survey of Statutory Limitations on Judicial Discretion, 50 Fordham L Rev 415, 415 (1981).
An early example of this assumption in judicial thinking appears in Van Atta v Van Atta, 6
Alaska 266, 267 (D Alaska Terr 1920) ("When a husband brings a suit for divorce, the grant-
ing of alimony to the wife is almost a matter of course, for the presumption of the law is
that she has no separate means, as the husband usually holds the purse strings.").
Actually, recent evidence suggests that alimony has never been awarded to more than a
small proportion of divorcing women. In 1990, the Bureau of the Census reported that only
16.8% of the 19.3 million ever-divorced and currently separated women (as of 1987) were
entitled to receive alimony under the divorce decree. Bureau of the Census, Current Popu-
lation Reports-Child Support and Alimony: 1987, Series P-23, No 167 at 11 (1990). See
generally Ira Ellman, Paul Kurtz, and Katharine Bartlett, Family Law: Cases, Text,
Problems 264-65 (Michie, 2d ed 1991). Although the 1990 Census Report included no calcu-
lation of the mean amount of alimony received by women in 1987, an earlier study indicated
that the mean amount of alimony received by women in 1985 was $3,730. Bureau of the
Census, Current Population Reports-Child Support and Alimony: 1985, Series P-23, No
152 at 6 (1989).
[60:67
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watchword was individual fulfillment-"doing your thing."33 This
focus on self rather than family paralleled the emerging women's
movement,3 4 the increasing number of women working outside the
home, 5 and the declining birth rate.3 6 Most significantly for the
homemaker, this new individualism sparked questions about the
legitimacy of fault-based divorce laws, which had been increasingly
viewed as "annoying anachronisms" since World War II.3 In the
period between the World Wars, such objections influenced courts
to relax the statutory prerequisites to divorce, such as adultery,
cruelty, or desertion, and to allow "the flimsiest fabrications to
masquerade as evidence of fault. '3 8
By 1969, dissatisfaction with state restrictions on divorce had
led California to enact a statute allowing divorce without a show-
ing of fault.3 9 In 1970, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws boldly approved a Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act ("UMDA"), which authorized the dissolution of any
"irretrievably broken" marriage without regard to marital fault.40
The states quickly followed suit.4 ' The heart of the no-fault re-
3 Chafe, Women and Equality at 167 (cited in note 16). See also O'Connell, 23 New
England L Rev at 492 (cited in note 31) (individualistic values triumphed with the passage
of no-fault legislation).
34 The women's movement has been characterized as both a source and a symptom of
the emphasis on individualism. Chafe, Women and Equality at 167 (cited in note 16).
11 Id at 121. See note 22. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination in
employment on the basis of sex. 42 USC §§ 2000e et seq (1988). See also Nancy Barrett,
Women and the Economy, in Sara E. Rix, ed, The American Woman 1987-88: A Report in
Depth 100 (Norton, 1987) (reporting that the number of women working for pay or looking
for paid work has increased by 28 million in the past 25 years).
38 Chafe, Women and Equality at 120 (cited in note 16). In 1957, the birth rate peaked
at 27.2 children per thousand persons; by 1967, it had declined to 17.9, the lowest rate since
the Depression. Id.
37 O'Connell, 23 New England L Rev at 478 (cited in note 31). For a criticism of this
focus on self, see Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law 108-11
(Harvard, 1988).
38 O'Connell, 23 New England L Rev at 479 (cited in note 31). See also Max Rheinstein,
Marriage Stability, Divorce and the Law 101-04 (Chicago, 1972); Silva v Silva, 28 Conn
Supp 336, 260 A2d 408, 409 (1969).
39 Cal Civ Code § 4508 (West 1983).
40 See Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act ("UMDA") §§ 302, 305, 9A ULA 181, 211
(West 1987).
41 See Doris Jonas Freed and Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An
Overview, 18 Family L Q 369, 379-82 (1985). Within five years after California enacted its
no-fault statute, most states adopted at least one no-fault ground. Franklin E. Zimring,
Foreword, in Steven D. Sugarman and Herma Hill Kay, eds, Divorce Reform at the Cross-
roads vii (Yale, 1990) ("Divorce Reform"). In the 15 years following approval of the UMDA,
every state except South Dakota amended its divorce statutes to allow divorce because of a
breakdown of the marriage. Freed and Walker, 18 Family L Q at 379. In 1985, South Dakota
added a no-fault provision to its list of fault-based grounds. Act of March 12, 1985, ch 207 §
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forms embodies the partnership notion that marriage is an associa-
tion of individuals42 who may dissolve their relationship at will,
compel the liquidation and distribution of their property, and
upon winding up their affairs, leave the relationship with no fur-
ther obligations to one another. This egalitarian scheme initially
held great appeal both for proponents of easy access to divorce and
for women's rights advocates whose equality rhetoric disavowed
the need for male financial support.43
Not surprisingly, as divorce became easier to obtain, the num-
ber of divorces skyrocketed.44 Less expectedly, the no'fault reforms
unmasked the reality that homemakers are "just a man away from
poverty. '45
C. The Reality-Economic Tragedy
When a woman whose principal job has been homemaking
loses her occupation and her patriarch, she faces a sea-change in
both income and status. The term "displaced homemaker" aptly
captures the refugee-like position of such a woman who, after as-
suming primary responsibility for homemaking is physically exiled
1, 1985 SD Laws 392, codified at SD Cod Laws §§ 25-4-2, 25-4-17.1 (1992). For a history of
the no-fault movement, see generally Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspec-
tive on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U Cin L Rev 1, 54 (1987).
42 The notion that a married woman may be a partner marks a radical departure from
the traditional common law view that a married woman lacks capacity to contract, see
Bradwell, 83 US at 141, and therefore cannot be a partner. See Little v Hazlett, 197 Pa 591,
47 A 855, 858 (1901).
" Alimony was sometimes viewed as an insult to women and an encumbrance to femi-
nine independence. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution at 359-60 (cited in note 6). See also
Betty Friedan, It Changed My Life 325-26 (Random House, 1976) where she explains:
The women's movement had just begun when the so-called divorce reform law was
passed. At that time, we were so concerned with principle-that equality of right and
opportunity had to mean equality of responsibility, and therefore alimony was
out-that we did not realize the trap we were falling into.
See also Susan Westerberg Prager, Shifting Perspectives on Marital Property Law, in Bar-
rie Thorne and Marilyn Yalom, eds, Rethinking the Family: Some Feminist Questions 111,
123 (Longman, 1982) (noting the failure of California feminists to foresee the economic ef-
fects of no-fault divorce on women); and Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ide-
ology, Contradiction and Social Change: A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regula-
tion of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 Wis L Rev 789, 853-85 (noting the mistaken
belief of Wisconsin reformers that injustice could be avoided by treating marriage as a part-
nership between equals and equally dividing marital property). But see Fauldi, Backlash at
20 (cited in note 11) (observing that feminists had almost nothing to do with divorce-law
reform).
" In the twelve years between 1963 and 1975, the divorce rate increased 100%. In each
following year until 1981, the divorce rate surpassed all previous U.S. records. In 1981, there
were 1.21 million divorces. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution at xvii (cited in note 6).
Status Report (1990) at 60 (cited in note 3).
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from her home. Her exile is not an isolated phenomenon. In its
1989 survey, the Census Bureau counted 15,600,000 displaced
homemakers, an increase of twelve percent over 1980 figures."' The
majority of mid-life and younger homemakers were displaced by
divorce or separation.47
A homemaker displaced through divorce often suffers an im-
mediate and dramatic decline in economic status. Lenore Weitz-
man's data indicate that in the first year after divorce women and
children average a seventy-three percent decline in their standard
of living while men enjoy a forty-two percent rise. e Often, dis-
placement plunges a homemaker into poverty. The Displaced
Homemakers Network ("DHN")49 reports that approximately
fifty-seven percent of former homemakers earn poverty or near-
poverty incomes,50 a figure that is even higher for women of color.5 1
46 Bureau of the Census, Current Population Report (1989) ("Population Report -
1989"). See also DHSSAA, 29 USCA § 2301(a)(3) (West Supp 1991) (stating the Congres-
sional finding that "there are approximately 15,600,000 displaced homemakers in the United
States, the majority of whom are women not in the labor force, who live in poverty and who
require educational, vocational, training and other services to obtain financial independence
and economic security"). Data on "displaced homemakers" can vary widely depending on
how the term is defined. Though the DHSSA refers to the Census Bureau tally of 15.6
million displaced homemakers, it is not clear that the Census Bureau used the DHSSA defi-
nition, quoted in note 7. The Displaced Homemakers Network ("DHN") defines "displaced
homemaker" very broadly; the data referred to in notes 47-52 is based on this broad
definition.
A displaced homemaker is a woman whose principal job has been homemaking and
who has lost her main source of income because of divorce, separation, widowhood,
disability, or long-term unemployment of a spouse, or loss of eligibility for public assis-
tance. If she is employed at all, she works part-time or part of the year.
Status Report (1990) at 1 (cited in note 3).
4 Approximately 55% of displaced homemakers ages 35-64 and 87% of those under 35
years old are divorced or separated. Id at 1.
48 Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution at 323 (cited in note 6). Those who criticize
Weitzman's figures often report a smaller post-divorce disparity in income. See, for example,
Faludi, Backlash at 19-25 (cited in note 11) (citing a study reporting a 30 percent temporary
decline in women's living standards and a 10-15 percent improvement for men).
' The DHN is a private, not-for-profit, national grass roots organization established in
1979. Jill Miller, Working Paper on Displaced Homemakers in the Employment and Train-
ing System 3 (1988) (on file with U Chi L Rev). The stated purpose of the DHN is "to
increase displaced homemakers' options for economic self-sufficiency, to provide information
about the public policy issues which affect displaced homemakers, to provide technical assis-
tance resources for service providers and to help . .' develop programs that work for dis-
placed homemakers." Id, outside back cover.
50 The DHN bases this calculation on the Census Bureau's definition of poverty, which
varies by household size, age of householder, and number of children and adults. See Status
Report (1990) at 20 (cited in note 3). In the 1989 survey, the poverty threshold for a house-
hold of three was $9,435. Id. A near poverty income, using 1989 measures, would be $14,125.
Id.
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Compounding her difficulties is the likelihood that a displaced
homemaker has lost any home she owned with her husband.52
The typical homemaker, who receives little or no property or
maintenance upon divorce,53 has at least three options for eco-
nomic survival: she can find a new husband, commence or expand
her participation in the labor force, or rely on public or private
assistance. Each of these options is beset with roadblocks.
The option most consistent with the sex/gender system is to
find a new husband. While a new husband may well provide imme-
diate financial relief, this option risks perpetuating a homemaker's
economic vulnerability, thus exposing her to the possibility that at
some later date, perhaps when marriage is less likely because of the
presence of children or advancing age, she will again lose her male
buffer. If the homemaker is older, her decision to wait for a new
male provider may be especially risky: recent studies suggest that
as a woman ages, her opportunities for remarriage decline dramati-
cally and much more decidedly than those of a man. 4 Indeed, an
older woman's decision to wait for a male rescuer suggests the irra-
tionality as well as the tenacity of the "Cinderella Complex"55
under the sex/gender system.
81 Id at 21. While 27.8% of White displaced homemakers are poor, 61% of Black dis-
placed homemakers and 62.3% of Hispanic displaced homemakers are poor. Id. While 23%
of White displaced homemakers are near-poor, only 20.1% of Black and 15.7% of Hispanic
displaced homemakers are near-poor. Id. Overall, the DHN concludes that approximately
one-half of White displaced homemakers and three-fourths of Black and Hispanic displaced
homemakers are living in or near poverty. Id.
52 The DHN, relying on 1989 Census Bureau figures, reports that while 56.1% of all
displaced homemakers own a home, only 34.6% of divorced or separated women are home-
owners. Status Report (1990) at 29-30 (cited in note 3). From this data, the DHN surmises
that "more than half of women who .. .divorce or separatfe] lose home ownership and
become renters." Id at 30 (emphasis in original). For a discussion of the disposition of the
marital home on divorce, see generally Comment, The Marital Home: Equal or Equitable
Distribution?, 50 U Chi L Rev 1089 (1983).
53 For a fuller discussion of property and maintenance determinations under no-fault,
see Section II.
54 See Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Conse-
quences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L Rev 1181, 1228-29
(1981). See also Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 Cal L Rev 3, 43-44 (1989).
This decline in marriageability through age is much less severe for men. Id. To state the
extreme, it is easier for the tycoon to find another trophy wife than for the trophy wife to
find another tycoon. But see Faludi, Backlash at 9-19 (cited in note 11) (debunking the
popular myth that never-married, college-educated women over thirty have a slim chance of
marriage.)
11 See generally Dowling, The Cinderella Complex (cited in note 30). Dowling describes
the "Cinderella Complex" as "a network of largely repressed attitudes and fears that keeps
women in a kind of half-light, retreating from the full use of their minds and creativity. Like
Cinderella, women today are still waiting for something external to transform their lives." Id
at 31.
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A more reasonable choice for a displaced homemaker might be
to commence or expand participation in the marketplace. The
homemaker who chooses this option, however, may be disillusioned
to discover that the marketplace largely mirrors the sexual division
of labor in the home. Despite recent expansion of employment op-
portunities, women continue to earn less than men and to find em-
ployment in the secondary job market where opportunities for ad-
vancement are limited.5
6
If she has been out of the labor force for any period, the home-
maker will probably never reach the income level she would have
enjoyed through uninterrupted wage-earning. Mincer and Polachek
found that women experience a 1.5 percent loss in earning capacity
for each year out of the labor force.57 Employers often view the
former full-time homemaker as an unattractive candidate for em-
ployment, due both to her lack of recent, full-time job experience,
and her limited or dated education. 8 Such a homemaker will be
hard-pressed to convince many prospective employers that her
caretaking skills have marketable value. 9
56 In 1969, women earned 63 cents to a man's $1.00. Mary Corcoran, Greg J. Duncan,
and Martha S. Hill, The Economic Fortunes of Women and Children: Lessons from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 10 Signs 232, 234 (1984). More recent data suggests con-
tinuing disparities. See Rhode, Justice and Gender at 161-75 (cited in note 11) (observing
that after 2,500 years the biblical valuation of women at 30 shekels and men at 50 has
remained fundamentally unchanged). Professor Rhode cites data from the late 1980 s indi-
cating that among full-time workers, the average female college graduate still earns signifi-
cantly less than the average male with a high school diploma. Id at 163. Such disparities
stem at least partly from the channeling of women into the secondary job market, which
offers low wages and little chance for advancement. These traditionally female jobs include
child care worker, clerical worker, waitress, and retail employee. See Status Report (1990) at
59 (cited in note 3). Susan Faludi reports that nearly 80% of working women are clustered
in traditional "female" jobs-as "secretaries, administrative 'support' workers and sales
clerks." Backlash at xiii (cited in note 11). See generally Julie A. Matthaei, An Economic
History of Women in America: Women's Work, The Sexual Division of Labor, and the
Development of Capitalism (Schocken, 1982).
57 Jacob Mincer and Solomon Polachek, Family Investments in Human Capital: Earn-
ings of Women, in Theodore W. Schultz, ed, Economics of the Family: Marriage, Children,
and Human Capital 397, 415 (Chicago, 1974).
as The DHN reports that 34% of displaced homemakers under age 35 and 39% of dis-
placed homemakers between ages 35 and 45 lacked a high school diploma. See Status Re-
port (1990) at 19 (cited in note 3). If an older homemaker has a college degree, it is likely to
be dated-a factor that will do little to improve her marketability, especially if she seeks
professional employment in a field in which she never worked. Consider, for example, the
plight of a nurse or medical technologist who seeks to market for the first time a degree she
earned in that field 20 years ago.
59 Dean Yarbrough suggests that long-term homemakers could increase their employ-
ment opportunities by persuasively documenting the experience they gained through home-
making, and she encourages potential employers to consider seriously these credentials. Yar-
brough, 49 L & Contemp Probs at 120, 124-25 (cited in note 3). But see Rae Andr6,
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If the homemaker is younger, her struggle to become self-sup-
porting may be frustrated by the same factor that initially limited
or precluded her participation in the labor force-she is likely to
be custodian of any children of the marriage and thus must con-
tinue to juggle the demands of home and family.60 If the home-
maker is older, the insidious reality of age discrimination com-
pounds her struggle. She may be considered too old for training
programs, both because she may have fewer years in which to ap-
ply that training and because she is perceived as inflexible, lacking
stamina, and given to health problems.6 1 Dean Marilyn Yarbrough
has observed that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") of 196762 has done little to combat this discrimination
against displaced homemakers.6
A displaced homemaker who is unsuccessful in her struggle for
economic self-sufficiency may turn to private or public organiza-
tions for help. This option is bound to be a disappointment. The
DHN is the principal private source of support for former home-
makers. This grass roots organization attempts to provide career
assessment and counseling, skills training, pre-employment prepa-
ration, and job placement services.6 4 Inadequate funding, however,
Homemakers, the Forgotten Workers 202 (Chicago, 1981) (warning that advising a woman
that her homemaking skills have market value may raise false hopes and damage her self-
esteem when she tries to sell her skills to an employer).
6 Ninety percent of the children in single-parent families live with their mothers. Eliz-
abeth A. Mulroy, Introduction, in Elizabeth A. Mulroy, ed, Women as Single Parents: Con-
fronting Institutional Barriers in the Courts, The Workplace, and the Housing Market 3
(Auburn House, 1988).
81 See Yarbrough, 49 L & Contemp Probs at 114 (cited in note 3).
02 29 USC §§ 621-34 (1988 and Supp 1990). The ADEA generally prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of age against non-federal employees between ages 40 and 70. Id at §§
631(a), 633(a).
8" See Yarbrough, 49 L & Contemp Probs at 109 (cited in note 3). Dean Yarbrough
notes that the legislative history of the ADEA suggests a limited focus: the family breadwin-
ner who finds himself unemployed and is experiencing difficulty in finding new employment
because of his age. Id. Indeed, Dean Yarbrough observes that most actions brought under
the ADEA have involved white males. Id at 111.
Dean Yarbrough explains that the ADEA's ability to curtail discrimination against dis-
placed homemakers has been hampered by a provision in the Act allowing an employer to
defend a claim of age discrimination by establishing that its action was "based on reasona-
ble factors other than age." See id. Such factors may include an applicant's lack of recent
full-time job experience-a common attribute of- a newly displaced homemaker.
6" DHN Program and Policy Statement, reprinted in National Displaced Homemakers
Network, A Handbook on State Displaced Homemaker Legislation: 1990-1991 Update 47
(1991) (on file with U Chi L Rev) ("Handbook").
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frustrates the ability of most programs to offer meaningful
services.6 5
State and federal programs that might aid displaced home-
makers also are generally ineffective.66 While at least twenty-six
states have legislation authorizing special programs for displaced
homemakers, 67 these programs receive minimal funding and are es-
pecially vulnerable to cutbacks during times of economic
difficulty.6
Federal programs have fared no better for the displaced home-
maker.6" A key example is the Job Training Partnership Act
("JTPA") of 1982,70 which seeks to "prepare ... unskilled adults
for entry into the labor force and to afford job training to those
economically disadvantaged individuals ... facing serious barriers
to employment .... -71 Despite its promising ambitions, JTPA has
disappointed displaced homemakers, who tend to be viewed as
poor investments and thus have difficulty obtaining JTPA funds.72
", Miller, Working Paper at 4 (cited in note 49). The DHN receives its funding through
government grants and private contributions. Most of the 1,000 programs the DHN oversees
are operated by a staff of only one to two full-time and one to two part-time employees, and
most operate on a budget of less than $40,000 per year. Id.
66 See the Congressional finding in DHSSAA, 29 USCA § 2301(a)(4): "Federal, state
and local programs addressing the training and employment needs of displaced homemakers
have been fragmented and insufficient to serve displaced homemakers effectively."
67 Handbook at 7 (cited in note 64).
66 The majority of states with displaced homemaker legislation appropriate between
$200,000 and $950,000 per year to the programs collectively. Id at 7. Fourteen states dis-
tribute less than $50,000 annually to individual programs. Six distribute $60,000 to $80,000
per program, and six distribute over $100,000 per program. Id at 11. Despite inflation and
rising costs, most states have failed to adjust annual funding for these programs. Id. During
the three years prior to 1991, at least four states cut their funded programs. Id.
69 See DHSSAA, 29 USCA § 2301(a)(4) (stating the Congressional finding that federal
as well as state programs have been ineffective in serving displaced homemakers).
70 29 USC §§ 1501 et seq (1988). Federal vocational education acts, such as the Perkins
Act of 1984, have also provided only minimal aid to displaced homemakers. See 29 USC
§ 2301 et seq (1991). The Perkins Act was originally designed to improve vocational pro-
grams, to correct patterns of underservice, and increase access to vocational education
among populations previously underserved. Carl D. Perkins Vocational Education Act of
1984, Pub L No 88-210 § 2, as amended by Pub L No 98-524 § 1, 98 Stat 2437, revised by
Pub L No 101-392, 104 Stat 756. It explicitly requires states to target 8.5% of their basic
state grants for vocational education to single parents and homemakers and to give special
attention to "displaced homemakers who ... are entering or reentering the labor force." 20
USCA at §§ 2332, 2372. As with JTPA, however, federal funding has been limited. See
Miller, Working Paper at 14 (cited in note 49). The 1990 amendments to the Perkins Act
specifically name displaced homemakers as a target population. 29 USCA § 2335.
71 29 USC § 1501 (1988).
7 Miller, Working Paper at 11 (cited in note 49). Miller, as Executive Director of the
DHN, reports that JTPA administrators emphasize the bottom line-securing high place-
ment rates for JTPA trainees. This emphasis encourages "creaming": choosing clients who
are most easily and cheaply placed in jobs. By definition, displaced homemakers are not
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Even if a displaced homemaker is selected for JTPA training, she
may experience only a marginal improvement in her marketability,
because training is delivered along "very traditional lines for each
gender. '73 As one DHN program reported: "Some of the training is
for jobs which turn out to be minimum-wage and part-time, such
as a recent one in telemarketing and telecommunication-phone
solicitation in other words. '74
More recently, Congress responded to the plight of displaced
homemakers by enacting the Displaced Homemakers Self-Suffi-
ciency Assistance Act ("DHSSAA"). 6 The DHSSAA allocates
funding for state programs that provide career counseling, training,
and placement for displaced homemakers. 6 It authorizes $35 mil-
lion for fiscal year 1991, and such sums as may be necessary
thereafter.77
While the DHN hails the DHSSAA as "landmark legisla-
tion, '7 8 it is something less than a panacea. A simple calculation
reveals that the $35 million authorized to "expand the employment
and self-sufficiency options of displaced homemakers" '79 will pro-
vide less than $3.00 for each of the 15.6 million displaced home-
makers in this country, most of whom live in poverty.s0 One won-
ders how much self-sufficiency $3.00 can buy.
Divorce may thus leave a displaced homemaker alone, with
limited employment options, and without meaningful assistance.
While no-fault did not create the sex/gender system that is largely
responsible for this situation, no-fault exacerbates the effects of
among this group. Id. Even if a displaced homemaker is selected for JTPA training, she
probably will not receive the financial support necessary to sustain her during her training.
Id. Moreover, the DHN complains that available funds can serve only 4 percent of the eligi-
ble population. Id.
73 Status Report (1990) at 62 (cited in note 3). One DHN program reported that it
referred very few clients for JTPA training because even with the training they could earn
little more than AFDC and in one case a woman was worse off than being on welfare. Miller,
Working Paper at 11 (cited in note 49).
74 Id.
75 29 USCA §§ 2301 et seq (West Supp 1991).
76 Id at § 2309.
7 Id at § 2314. States must compete for DHSSAA funds in any year in which appropri-
ations are under $25 million; in years in which the annual appropriation reaches $25 million
or more, financial assistance is allocated to every state in proportion to the adult population
of that state. Id at §§ 2303, 2306.
78 Displaced Homemakers Network, Guide to the Displaced Homemakers Self-Suffi-
ciency Act 5 (1991).
79 DHSSAA, 29 USCA § 2301(b).
80 Id at § 2301(a)(3).
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that system by removing the insulation of marriage from increasing
numbers of women with little thought to economic consequence.
II. THE MISTAKES OF NO-FAULT
The no-fault reformers devoted much effort to selling the con-
cept of no-fault, but gave little consideration to its economic conse-
quences.8 1 Rather incidentally, the no-fault campaign inspired two
significant changes in the rules affecting the economics of divorce.
First, no-fault reforms encourage final settlement of the parties'
mutual obligations through a one-time division of marital prop-
erty, 2 thus effecting a clean break."3 Second, no-fault reforms pre-
sume that any maintenance awarded should be temporary and for
the purpose of rehabilitating a needy spouse. 4 While each change
often can be traced to specific language in no-fault statutes, the
draconian application of these general rules has come at the hands
of gender-biased courts vested with very broad discretionary pow-
ers. As applied, no-fault reforms in both the division of property
and the award of maintenance have made divorce a financial catas-
trophe for homemakers.
A. Property Distribution
No-fault presumes that a one-time division of traditional
property on divorce will equitably settle the parties' rights and re-
sponsibilities. This presumption has proved to be wishful thinking.
The typical insubstantial amount of tangible marital assets, to-
gether with the discretionary nature of the division of those assets,
often make the division of property both insignificant and
unpredictable.
82 O'Connell, 23 New England L Rev at 493 (cited in note 31), citing Levy, Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Legislation: A Preliminary Analysis 138-39 (papers prepared for the
Special Committee on Divorce of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws).
"8 See UMDA, § 308 Official Comment, 9A ULA 348 (West 1987):
The dual intention of this section and Section 307 is to encourage the court to provide
for the financial needs of the spouses by property disposition rather than by an award
of maintenance. Only if the available property is insufficient for the purpose and if the
spouse who seeks maintenance is unable to secure employment appropriate to his skills
and interests or is occupied with child care may an award of maintenance be ordered.
83 For a discussion of the partnership roots of this clean break, see notes 188-94 and
accompanying text.
54 See text accompanying note 159.
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1. Minimal assets.
When marital assets are substantial, a court might ease the
financial straits of a homemaker with low income potential by
awarding her a significant amount of marital property. Most mari-
tal estates, however, are too small to make this option feasible.8 5 It
is not unusual for lower and middle-class couples to live from
paycheck to paycheck and to own few if any significant assets. In
the worst case, in which a couple's debts exceeds its assets, the
homemaker who receives most or even all of the marital property
may still receive little or nothing."' Often, a couple's only impor-
tant asset is equity in a marital residence.8 7 When the parties lack
other assets, this equity can be divided only if the home is sold;8
in fact, sale of the home is frequently ordered. 9 A homemaker may
85 Professor Weitzman's research, for example, indicates that half of the divorcing
couples in Los Angeles county in 1978 had less than $20,000 in assets. Weitzman, The Di-
vorce Revolution at 56-57 (cited in note 6). See also Ilene E. Shapiro and Barry P. Schatz,
Has the Illinois Equitable Distribution Statute Advanced the Cause of the Homemaker?,
M Bar J 492, 500 (June 1986) ("most estates are too small to support anyone").
11 Several legal commentators have advocated an unequal division of property. Profes-
sor Martha Fineman, for example, argues that an equal division of property is inequitable
since "need cannot be alleviated by equal divisions so long as other factors between men
and women remain unequal." Fineman, The Illusion of Equality at 178 (cited in note 13).
What is needed, suggests Professor Fineman, is result-equality rather than rule-equality. Id
at 2-6. See also Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and Alimony:
The Division of Property to Address Need, 56 Fordham L Rev 827, 907-16 (1988); Barbara
Stark, Burning Down the House: Toward a Theory of More Equitable Distribution, 40
Rutgers L Rev 1173, 1179 (1988) (homemaking wife should presumptively receive more than
half of property). It is true that many women will be severely disadvantaged if they receive
an equal division of marital property and nothing more. It is my position, however, that
such women should receive something more: maintenance as buyout.
11 From data collected in 1979, Professor Mary Ann Glendon reported that approxi-
mately 65% of families owned a house, and that nearly 41% lived in mortgaged homes with
an average equity of $26,000. Mary Ann Glendon, The New Family and the New Property
94 (Butterworths, 1981). More recently, Professor Marsha Garrison reported a similar inci-
dence of home ownership in New York (64% in 1978, 68% in 1984) and much greater equity
($61,665 in 1978 and $83,968 in 1984). Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Divorce, Chang-
ing Rules, Changing Results, in Divorce Reform at 75, 82, 88 (cited in note 41). Professor
Garrison's equity figures are based on a survey of 900 contested divorces. Id.
88 A homemaker might avoid sale, of course, if there are other assets to offset against
the home equity or if she has separate property sufficient to enable her to buy out her
husband's interest.
" The DHN reports that roughly one-half of the displaced homemakers who are di-
vorced or separated lose home ownership and become renters. Status Report (1990) at 30
(cited in note 3) (extrapolating from data contained in the Census Bureau's 1989 Current
Population Survey). Weitzman reports erosion in California of the long tradition of award-
ing the family home to the wife, especially if she has custody of children. In 1968, wives in
Los Angeles and San Francisco were awarded 60% or more of the marital property, which
usually allowed them to keep the family home. With the advent of no-fault in 1970, the
wives' share of the property declined and the number of family homes ordered sold upon
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thus leave the marriage with limited income potential, few if any
assets, and no home.
Some courts and legislatures concerned by this possibility
have attempted to increase the pool of marital assets by expanding
the definition of marital property. An expanded definition might
include such nontraditional assets as a spouse's pension, goodwill
in a business, and a professional degree or license. Increasing the
marital pot allows a court to award a low-income wife a larger
share of traditional property or a lump-sum payment reflecting her
share of nontraditional property.
Some nontraditional assets are more often characterized as
marital property than others. Most states, either by statute or judi-
cial decision, have expanded the definition of marital property to
include pensions and retirement plans.90 Identifying a method of
valuation and a proper time for distribution, however, continues to
trouble courts.
A recurring issue is whether the pension is to be valued at the
time of divorce (the immediate offset method), or "if, as, and
when" it is received (the deferred distribution approach).91 The
choice is often left to the discretion of a trial court.92 If a couple
lacks other significant assets, a court's decision to value and dis-
divorce skyrocketed. In 1968, courts explicitly ordered sale of the family home in one case in
ten; by 1977 this figure had risen to one in three. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution at 30-
31 (cited in note 6). Concern for the welfare of children led California in 1988 to enact
legislation favoring deferred sale when minor children are in the home. Cal Civ Code §
4700.10(a)(2) (West Supp 1991). For a discussion of this provision, see Herma Hill Kay,
Beyond No-Fault; New Directions in Divorce Reform, in Divorce Reform at 6, 21-22 (cited
in note 41). See also Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Divorce, in Divorce Reform at 88
(reporting a statistically significant increase between 1978 and 1984 in the number of divorc-
ing husbands who retained the marital home).
90 Freed and Walker, 18 Family L Q at 424-26 (cited in note 41). See generally Note,
Pension Awards in Divorce and Bankruptcy, 88 Colum L Rev 194 (1988); and Grace
Blumberg, Marital Property Treatment of Pensions, Disability Pay, Workers' Compensa-
tion and Other Wage Substitutes: An Insurance, or Replacement, Analysis, 33 UCLA L
Rev 1250 (1986). For a discussion of pension benefits in community property states, see
Phoebe Carter and John Myers, Division and Distribution of the Community Interest in
Defined Benefit Pensions: Schweitzer Reconsidered, 18 NM L Rev 95 (1988).
Compare Kilbride v Kilbride, 172 Mich App 421, 432 NW2d 324, 331 (1988); and
Shill v Shill, 115 Idaho 115, 765 P2d 140, 145 (1988) (both employing immediate offset
method); with Cearley v Cearley, 544 SW2d 661 (Tex 1976); and In re Marriage of Brown,
15 Cal 3d 838, 126 Cal Rptr 633, 544 P2d 561, 569-70 (1976) (both employing deferred dis-
tribution approach). See also Ind Code Ann § 31-1-11.5-11(b)(4) (West Supp 1992) (author-
izing a trial court to distribute pension benefits by "setting aside to either of the parties a
percentage of those payments either by assignment or in kind at the time of receipt").
2 See Ind Code Ann § 31-1-11.5-11(b) (directing a trial court to divide property in a
"just and reasonable manner" by "ordering the distribution of any [pension] benefits"). See
also id at § 11(b)(4) (apparently addressing the distribution rather than valuation).
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tribute benefits when they are received may leave a homemaker
financially strapped until her spouse chooses to retire. Moreover,
sharing of pension benefits can provide meaningful relief for a
homemaker only when sizable benefits exist.
Generally, the definition of marital property includes goodwill
in a business if it was acquired during the marriage and has mar-
ketable value. 93 There are limits, however, to the general willing-
ness of courts to value and divide this goodwill. Recently, a New
York court declined to expand goodwill concepts to include celeb-
rity status, concluding that a musician's royalties from his record-
ings were the only marital asset deriving from his celebrity sta-
tus.94 Moreover, one suspects that not all trial courts seriously
consider evidence of goodwill. Weitzman reports, for example, that
some California judges actually consider testimony regarding good-
will a farce.95
Very few courts have expanded the definition of property to
include a spouse's professional degree or license,96 although courts
11 See Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in Di-
vorce Reform 6, 13-14 (cited in note 41). In 1985, Weitzman reported that Los Angeles
judges found goodwill in "the professional practices of an accountant, architect, banker, con-
sultant, dentist, doctor, engineer, insurance agent, lawyer, pharmacist, professor, sales repre-
sentative, social worker, and in a wide range of small and large businesses including a barber
shop, hardware store, restaurant, indoor sign business, and beauty salon chain." Weitzman,
The Divorce Revolution at 122 (cited in note 6). The goodwill in these enterprises was val-
ued at between $100 and $720,000. Id.
More recently, a New Jersey court, in a widely-publicized case, found that Joe Piscopo's
"celebrity goodwill" was a marital asset subject to distribution. See Piscopo v Piscopo, 232
NJ Super 559, 557 A2d 1040, 1042-43 (1988).
9' See Getz v Getz, 15 Family L Rep (BNA) 1254, 1254 (NY Sup Ct 1989). For a discus-
sion of New York's treatment of celebrity status on divorce, see generally Note, "Do You
Promise to Love, Honor, and Equitably Divide Your Celebrity Status on Divorce?" A Look
at the Development and Application of New York's. Equitable Distribution Statute, 9
Loyola Ent L J 153 (1989). For a discussion not limited to New York, see generally John R.
Phillips, Valuing Intangible Celebrity Assets, 12 LA Lawyer 24 (April 1989).
9' Weitzman cites one California judge, for example, who frankly acknowledged,
To tell you the truth, I think goodwill is a lot of b.s. There's nothing there. And it
burns me up to have to sit there for hour after hour listening to b.s. from accountants.
They invent the formulas on the spot .... They think they are putting one over be-
cause they bring in color charts and graphs .... Well, I don't buy any of it.
Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution at 123 (cited in note 6).
9" See Kay, Beyond No-Fault in Divorce Reform at 14 (cited in note 41) ("virtually all
the states that have faced the issue to date have resisted the characterization of professional
degrees or licenses as property subject to division upon divorce"). For an argument in sup-
port of a property classification, by an author who ultimately criticizes it, see Joan M.
Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Mari-
tal Investor in Human Capital, 28 Kan L Rev 379 (1980).
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in over half the states have addressed this question.9 7 Cases raising
this issue usually involve a recently-acquired advanced degree or
license that has not matured into a business or practice and thus
has not yet generated any marital property.98
The refusal of courts to classify such a degree or license as
property reflects a general view that this intangible "is simply an
intellectual achievement that may potentially assist in the future
acquisition of property. ... [I]t has none of the attributes of prop-
erty in the usual sense of that term."'9 The occasional effort of
trial courts to classify such an intangible as property is often re-
versed on appeal. 00
The facts of O'Brien v O'Brien, a 1985 New York case, aptly
demonstrate the inequity that can result from insistence upon
traditional definitions of property.10 Eighteen months after their
wedding, the O'Briens moved to Mexico so that Mr. O'Brien could
attend medical school. During most of the couple's nine-year mar-
riage, Ms. O'Brien worked as a teacher to finance her husband's
medical education. The same year he received his medical degree,
Mr. O'Brien commenced divorce proceedings. Since Ms. O'Brien
appeared ineligible for maintenance under New York law, 0 2 and
97 Virginia S. Renick, Spousal Contribution to a Professional Degree Upon Divorce:
The State of the Law, in Ronald L. Brown, ed, Valuing Professional Practices and Li-
censes; A Guide for the Matrimonial Practitioner 27, 29 (Prentice Hall, 1987).
" See Stanley L. Goodman, How Dr. O'Brien's Medical License Was Valued, in
Brown, Valuing Professional Practices 77, 86 (cited in note 97) (explaining that if Dr.
O'Brien's license to practice medicine had matured into a practice, the practice rather than
the license would have been valued). Compare John F. Burke, Jr. and Harvey S. Rosen,
Valuing Educational Attainment as a Distributable Asset, in Brown, Valuing Professional
Practices 61, 71-72 (cited in note 97) (arguing that a practice'and license do not necessarily
merge and should be separately valued).
9 In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo 429, 574 P2d 75, 76 (1978). In Graham, the
husband attended school for three and one-half of the six years of marriage; the wife con-
tributed 70% of the income; and there were no tangible marital assets. Id at 76. While the
court refused to classify the husband's degree in business administration as marital prop-
erty, it suggested that the degree could be considered in the division of property and in any
maintenance award. Id at 78.
100 See, for example, Lynn v Lynn, 49 USLW 2402 (NJ Super 1980), rev'd, 91 NJ 510,
453 A2d 539, 542 (1982); Inman v Inman, 578 SW2d 266, 268 (Ky App 1979), rev'd, 648
SW2d 847, 852 (Ky 1982).
101 66 NY2d 576, 498 NYS2d 743, 489 NE2d 712 (1985).
'01 See Goodman, Dr. O'Brien's Medical License at 79 (cited in note 98) (attorney who
testified as expert witness for Ms. O'Brien believed maintenance was not available to her).
Even in cases where it is available, maintenance may be an inadequate basis for alleviating
income disparity in a student/non-student marriage, because maintenance typically termi-
nates upon the remarriage of a receiving spouse-a consequence that seems inconsistent
with the investment nature of a non-student's contribution. Courts have noted this problem
in various cases involving a non-student spouse. See, for example, Hubbard v Hubbard, 603
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the couple had not yet acquired significant traditional property,103
Ms. O'Brien's financial recovery depended on her ability to con-
vince the court to reach beyond traditional definitions of property
and award her a share of her husband's professional license. In an
extraordinary departure from tradition, the Court of Appeals did
just that. Classifying Mr. O'Brien's medical license as marital
property, the Court Of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's award of
forty percent of its present value to Ms. O'Brien.104 The court's
holding, however, was limited to an.interpretation of the legislative
intent underlying New York's Equitable Distribution Law, which
the court found deliberately exceeded traditional property con-
cepts. 0 5 Unfortunately for other wives who finance their husbands'
educations, O'Brien continues to be an extraordinary case.
Although few courts classify a professional degree or license as
property, many courts perceive some inequity when parties divorce
before investments in education have generated traditional marital
property.10 6 While practitioners' attempts to urge a property classi-
P2d 747, 752 (Okla 1979). See also Woodworth v Woodworth, 126 Mich App 258, 337 NW2d
332, 337 (1983); and O'Brien, 489 NE2d at 717-18.
103 O'Brien, 489 NE2d at 713.
104 Id at 714. This percentage amounted to $188,800. Id. The value of such a license,
reasoned the court, lies in "the enhanced earning capacity it affords the holder." Id at 717.
Compare the refusal of a New Jersey court to classify a master's degree in business adminis-
tration as marital property because its value consisted of "nothing more than the possibility
of enhanced earnings." Mahoney, 453 A2d at 532.
105 489 NE2d at 715. See also Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault
Divorce Law, 75 Cal L Rev 291, 313 n 171 (1987). Applying O'Brien, the New York Appel-
late Division recently included a wife's master's degree within the definition of marital prop-
erty. See McGowan v McGowan, 535 NYS2d 990, 142 AD2d 355 (1988).
100 Often, courts attempt to aid a non-student spouse without actually classifying a de-
gree or license as property. One example is Woodworth, 337 NW2d at 332. In Woodworth,
the court affirmed division of the value of a husband's law degree while candidly conceding
that "whether or not an advanced degree can physically or metaphysically be defined as
'property' is beside the point." Id. The preferred approach, reasoned the court, is to "focus
on the most equitable solution to dissolving the marriage and dividing among the respective
parties what they have." Id.
Other courts have sought to address a perceived inequity by construing maintenance
statutes broadly enough to authorize a lump-sum payment to a non-student spouse. See, for
example, In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis 2d 1, 318 NW2d 918, 923 (1982) (approving
maintenance award compensating a wife for her contribution to her husband's medical de-
gree during an eight-year marriage). Such a broad construction of maintenance statutes is
not always possible. See text accompanying notes 157-68.
Still other courts have invoked their equity powers to order restitution of the non-stu-
dent's monetary contributions to avoid unjust enrichment. See Hubbard, 603 P2d at 752;
and De LaRosa v De LaRosa, 309 NW2d 755, 758 (Minn 1981). This restitution may be
labelled "reimbursement alimony." See Mahoney, 453 A2d at 534, where a New Jersey court
defined reimbursement alimony to include household expenses, educational costs, and travel
expenses to school. See also Saint Pierre v Saint Pierre, 357 NW2d 250, 262 (SD 1984)
[60:67
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fication on unmatured degrees or licenses is an understandable ef-
fort to alleviate income disparity, one must question the concep-
tual integrity of efforts to contort these intangibles to fit within
traditional definitions of property.10 7
Moreover, a redefinition of property to include intangible as-
sets addresses only the extraordinary case of a non-student spouse
whose investment has not yet generated traditional property, and
it offers no help for the more ordinary homemaker whose husband
has not earned a professional degree or license. The caretaking
wife of a nonprofessional employee, for example, would be hard-
pressed to establish a property right in her husband's job, no mat-
ter how senior his position. Expansion of the definition of marital
property incompletely answers the problem of the displaced
homemaker.
No-fault thus mistakenly assumes that couples will have
enough traditional property to allow a court to split that property
in a way that will afford equity to a homemaker. The broad judi-
cial discretion afforded trial courts to apportion property only
compounds this mistake.
(denying reimbursement alimony to husband who did not incur personal sacrifice to further
wife's medical education); and Lehmicke v Lehmicke, 339 Pa Super 559, 489 A2d 782 (1985)
(wife should be compensated for financial support she gave husband while he was medical
student). Sometimes such restitution is authorized by statute. See, for example, Ind Code
Ann § 31-1-11.5-11 (West Supp 1992) (authorizing recovery of contributions to tuition,
books, and laboratory fees). See also Cal Civ Code § 4800.3 (West Supp 1992) (authorizing
reimbursement for education or training that "substantially enhances" earning capacity, but
creating a rebuttable presumption that if divorce occurs ten or more years after the contri-
bution, no reimbursement is necessary because the contributing spouse has already benefit-
ted from enhanced earnings). See also La Civ Code Ann, art 121 (West 1992) (authorizing
an award for "financial contributions made during the marriage to education or training of
his spouse that increased the spouse's earning power, to the extent that the claimant did not
benefit during the marriage from the increased earning power"). Such a restitution approach
differs significantly from a property classification or maintenance, because restitution will
often allow recovery of a sum much smaller than the enhanced earnings of the student
spouse.
207 See EUman, 77 Cal L Rev at 69 (cited in note 54): "By any modest definition degrees
and licenses are not property. Unfortunately, our existing law is so inflexible that some
courts thought it necessary to pretend they were, in order to provide a remedy for the wo-
man who was treated like a scholarship." But see Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution at 53
(cited in note 6).
Other commentators have objected to inclusion of a degree or license within the defini-
tion of marital property on the ground that it tends to reintroduce notions of involuntary
servitude. See Kay, 75 Cal L Rev at 312-13 (cited in note 105). See also Severs v Severs, 426
S2d 992, 994 (Fla App 1983).
Such an objection might be answered by characterizing a claim to enhanced earnings as
maintenance which, unlike property, is modifiable upon a showing of changed circumstance.
Thus, if a student spouse earned less than anticipated because of death, illness, or other
reason, the claim of the non-student spouse might be reduced. See Section III.B., offering a
partnership model to support this result.
19931
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2. Palm-tree justice.108
[T]he discretion of a judge is the law of tyrants; it is always
unknown; it is different in different men; it is casual, and de-
pends upon constitution, temper and passion. In the best it is
oftentimes caprice; in the worst, it is every vice, folly and pas-
sion to which human nature can be liable. 09
The possibility that a homemaker will receive less than half
the marital property at the hands of a trial court vested with broad
discretion exacerbates the problem of few assets. Most states have
adopted equitable distribution statutes, patterned after the
UMDA, which authorize a trial court to divide property in a just,
reasonable, or equitable manner. 1" 0 Often, the only statutory con-
straint is that a court "consider" certain factors."' Such a directive
gives a trial court virtually unfettered discretion. Consequently, a
108 The term "palm tree justice" refers to the practice of a Moslem Cadi or judge who
sits beneath a palm tree dispensing justice according to individual views of fairness.
Freed from compliance with any legal rules or fixed principles, the Cadi does what
seems to him to be justice on the facts of the particular case. It may be that no two
Cadis would decide any one case in precisely the same way, for individual views of what
is fair and just vary more than individual views of the law; yet for that reason it is
rarely possible to say with certitude that the decision of any Cadi is wrong.
Nicholas Bala, Judicial Discretion and Family Law Reform in Canada, 5 Canadian J Fam-
ily L 15, 16 n 4 (1986).
109 State v Cummings, 36 Mo 263, 278-79 (1865) (quoting Lord Camden), rev'd, 71 US
(4 Wall) 277, 332 (1866). For a more recent discussion of judicial discretion, see Maurice
Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 Syracuse L Rev
635, 637 (1971).
I1 There are 40 equitable distribution common law property states. See Doris Jonas
Freed and Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 24 Family L
Q 309, 335-36 (1991). Of the ten community property states, three require the equitable
distribution of property, and one requires an equal distribution unless inequitable. Id.
The UMDA authorizes a trial court to "equitably apportion" property. UMDA § 307,
9A ULA 238 (West 1987) (Alternative A). Curiously, while the UMIDA purports to adopt a
partnership model, it rejects the partnership rule that partnership property be divided
"equally" upon dissolution, thus foregoing the bright-line rule of partnership law in favor of
deference to trial court discretion.
' UMDA § 307, 9A ULA 238 (West 1987) (Alternative A), directs the court to
consider:
the duration of the marriage, and prior marriage of either party, antenuptial agreement
of the parties, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and source of income, voca-
tional skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties, custodial
provisions, whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and
the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income.
The court must also consider "the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisi-
tion, preservation, depreciation, or appreciation in value of the respective estates, and the
contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit." Id.
Notably, while § 307 specifies factors a court should consider, it does not explicitly
preclude a court from considering any other factor, except marital misconduct. Moreover,
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court may base its decision on factors outside those listed in the
statute or give one listed factor (such as a spouse's greater financial
contribution to the marriage) disproportionate and dispositive
weight.
Weitzman's data suggest that judges vested with broad discre-
tion may be guided by curious assumptions. She reported an as-
sumption among some trial courts, for example, that "it is fair to
divide family income so that the wife and children share one-third,
while the husband keeps the other two-thirds for himself.""' 2
Many judges, Weitzman observed, frankly acknowledge a reluc-
tance "to recognize the goodwill in a profession because it would be
too difficult for the husband to raise the capital to 'buy back his
wife's share.' "13 These same courts then minimize the difficulties
faced by a long-term homemaker who must raise capital to buy out
her husband's share of the home." 4
Recently, the attitudes Weitzman observed have been more
widely documented in studies reporting gender bias in the
courts." 5 At least thirty states have established task forces to in-
vestigate the possibility of gender bias." 6 Each of the nine states
that has published its findings reports that "gender bias detrimen-
tal to women permeates every aspect of marital dissolution and
child support."1 7 A New Jersey task force, for example, concluded
that despite efforts to achieve gender equity, "New Jersey women
of all ages may be the victims of a gender-based maldistribution of
earnings and resources at or after divorce."" 8
A Michigan task force found that the "resolution of economic
issues is often premised on misconceptions about the economic
§ 307 fails to specify the weight to be given each factor or to define a range of judicial
choice. For a criticism of the breadth of judicial discretion allowed under a similar Indiana
statute, see text accompanying notes 123-34. For a listing, by state, of statutory factors for
judicial consideration, see Freed and Walker, 24 Family L Q at 343-44 (cited in note 110).
See also Note, 50 Fordham L Rev at 448-49 (cited in note 32).
112 Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution at 396 (cited in note 6).
13 Id at 397.
114 Id.
6 Michigan Supreme Court Task Force on Gender Issues in the Courts, Conclusions
and Recommendations 1 (ca. 1990) (on file with U Chi L Rev). For a discussion of gender
bias in New York and elsewhere, see generally Isabel Marcus, Reflections on the Signifi-
cance of the Sex/Gender System: Divorce Law Reform in New York, 42 U Miami L Rev 55
(1987).
116 Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender and Justice: Florida and the Nation, 42 Fla L Rev
181, 186 & n 18 (1990).
17 Id at 187.
Il Lynn Hecht Schafran, Documenting Gender Bias in the Courts: The Task Force
Approach, 70 Judicature 280, 285 (1987).
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consequences of divorce for women" and that "[s]ome judges and
attorneys fail to recognize a spouse's loss of career or career poten-
tial as a meaningful contribution to the economic partnership of
the marriage."' 19 A New York task force reported a tendency
among trial judges to undervalue homemaker contributions and to
ignore the permanent economic loss of women who forego their
own careers.120 As one legislator poignantly stated:
[Male] perspective on family life has skewed decisions in equi-
table distribution cases. The perception of most men-and
the judiciary is mostly male-is that care of the house and
children can be done with one hand tied behind the back.
Send the kids out to school, put them to bed, and the rest of
the time free to play tennis and bridge. They think any wo-
man-no matter her age or lack of training-can find a nice
little job and a nice little apartment and conduct her later
years as she might have done at age 25.121
To be sure, not all judges entertain such attitudes; sometimes
a homemaker receives fair treatment at the hands of a trial court.
The financial fate of a homemaker, however, should never depend
on the goodwill or prejudice of a particular trial judge. Because the
stakes for homemakers are so high, the frequency with which
judges dispense unfair treatment is deeply troubling.
To make matters worse, a homemaker cannot expect critical
appellate review of an unfair trial court decision. Broad judicial
discretion inherently tends to frustrate meaningful appellate re-
view. To prevail on appeal, a spouse must establish that a trial
court abused its discretion1 2 -a difficult task indeed when a stat-
ute implicitly authorizes a court to rely on personal notions of
fairness.
The minimal assets in many marriages, together with the
broad discretion afforded trial courts under equitable distribution
statutes and the widespread bias against homemaking women,
make it unlikely that a one-time division of traditional property
Michigan Task Force, Conclusions at 8 (cited in note 115).
120 Schafran, 70 Judicature at 285 (cited in note 118). The New York task force also
reported a pattern of refusal by trial judges to award adequate or timely counsel and expert
witness fees to women with no identifiable assets. Id.
121 Id.
122 See Homer Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States 600-01
(West, 2d ed 1988). Professor Clark observes that the vague standard of "just" or "equita-
ble" makes it "nearly impossible to generalize from the decisions or to predict their out-
come." Id at 601. See also text accompanying notes 132-34.
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will alone fairly settle the rights of the parties. The Indiana judici-
ary's application of its equitable distribution statute strikingly
demonstrates this reality.
3. An Indiana story.
Much like the UMDA, the Indiana equitable distribution stat-
ute as originally drafted simply directed a trial court to divide
marital property 12 3 in a just and reasonable manner. 124 A court was
required to "consider" several UMDA-style factors, including the
contribution of a spouse as homemaker.1 25 Applying this language
in Luedke v Luedke, 26 the Indiana Supreme Court adopted a pos-
ture decidedly unfavorable to homemakers. The trial court had
awarded less than half the marital property to a homemaker who
had not been employed outside the home for nineteen years.12 7
The disparity in the parties' earning abilities was extreme; Mr.
Luedke held a secure, high-paying executive position earning ap-
proximately $100,000 per year, while Ms. Luedke had no income
123 The statutory definition of marital property in Indiana did not and does not specifi-
cally include a spouse's professional degree, license, or interest in a career. See Ind Code
Ann §§ 31-1-11.5-2, 31-1-11.5-11(d) (West Supp 1992). This latter section allows a spouse
who has financed her husband's higher education to recover her contribution toward his
tuition, books, and laboratory fees. However, even this limited recovery is authorized only
where there is little or no marital property. Marital property now specifically includes pen-
sion benefits, including benefits that are vested but will not become payable until after the
divorce. Ind Code Ann § 31-1-11.5-2(d)(2) (West Supp 1992). This section was added in
1985 and was hailed as a great victory for homemakers who prior to 1985 could not claim a
share of a spouse's pension plan that was not vested, even though the value of the plan was
substantial and it was the couple's only asset.
Pub L No 297, 1973 Ind Acts 1585, formerly codified at Ind Code Ann § 31-1-11.5-
11.
1 See id. Former § 11(b) directed a trial court to consider the following factors:
(1) the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, including the
contribution of a spouse as homemaker.
(2) the extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse prior to the marriage
or through inheritance or gift.
(3) the economic circumstances of the spouse at the time the disposition of the prop-
erty is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family residence
or the right to dwell in that residence for such periods as the court may deem just to
the spouse having custody of any children.
(4) the conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dis-
sipation of their property.
(5) the earnings or earning ability of the parties related to a final division of property
and final determination of the property rights of the parties.
Pub L No 180, 1980 Ind Acts 1573, formerly codified at Ind Code § 31-1-11.5-11(b).
487 NE2d 133 (Ind 1985).
1'7 Luedke v Luedke, 476 NE2d 853, 855 (Ind App 1985), rev'd 487 NE2d 133 (Ind
1985).
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but hoped to earn $12,000 per year after training in respiratory
therapy.
128
In an ill-fated attempt at critical review, the Indiana Court of
Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding
Ms. Luedke less than half the marital assets. The court stated that
the equitable distribution statute required a "50-50 division of the
property between a breadwinner and homemaker, absent a deter-
mination by the court that one spouse has seriously neglected his
or her role.' 1 29 Such a starting point, said the court, would put bite
into appellate review. °30
The Indiana Supreme Court, however, swiftly rejected the
concept of a 50-50 starting point, explaining that no language in
the statute authorized it. The court added that although a judge
perhaps ought initially to lean toward a 50-50 split, a judge could
not be required to do so.'3 ' Even before Luedke, Indiana appellate
judges had complained that a divorce court's broad discretion frus-
trated meaningful appellate review of property divisions. 32 After
Luedke, one appellate judge concluded that appellate review had
become "little more than pretense."'133 Two years after the Su-
preme Court's decision, the Indiana legislature, in 1987, amended
its property distribution statute to require a trial court to "pre-
sume that an equal division of the marital property between the
parties is just and reasonable.' i3 4
The Indiana story is encouraging in its demonstration that
legislation can limit judicial discretion to award a homemaker less
than half of marital assets, but disturbing in its implicit suggestion
that in states without such legislation courts can continue to do so.
Even when legislation deters the worst abuses of judicial discre-
tion, however, the no-fault assumption that a one-time division of
property will afford equity between spouses is a mistake. The mini-
mal assets in most marriages, together with the disparate earning
abilities of a homemaker and a breadwinner, suggest that a home-
maker should receive something in addition to a share of marital
assets. No-fault compounds its first mistake, however, by discour-
aging a court from awarding maintenance.
121 Id at 855-56.
120 Id at 860.
130 Id at 865.
131 487 NE2d at 134-35.
132 See Lord v Lord, 443 NE2d 847, 850-51 n 4 (Ind App 1982).
133 See Baker v Baker, 488 NE2d 361, 366-67 (Ind App 1986) (Young concurring).
134 Ind Code Ann § 31-1-11.5-11(c) (West Supp 1992). This presumption may be rebut-
ted by any relevant evidence, including evidence relating to the factors listed in note 111.
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B. Maintenance
Alimony was never intended to assure a perpetual state of se-
cured indolence. It should not be suffered to convert a host of
physically and mentally competent young women into an
army of alimony drones, who neither toil nor spin, and be-
come a drain on society and a menace to themselves."3 5
Alimony has a terrible reputation. For many, the word triggers
nasty visions of the abused male, as indolent young women enjoy a
country-club life style at the expense of their hard-working, yet
impoverished, ex-husbands. Such visions, though largely mythical,
seem close to the core of current no-fault statutes that discourage
indefinite maintenance. 136
1. Discouraging support.
The no-fault scheme, explains the UMDA, is "to provide for
the financial needs of the spouses by property distribution rather
than by an award of maintenance.' 137 If any maintenance is
awarded, courts expect that it should extend for only the limited
period necessary to rehabilitate a spouse."8" This clean-break
scheme mistakenly assumes that marital assets will be sizeable
enough to afford equity through the division of property with
nothing more' and is overly optimistic about the possibilities for
rehabilitation of a homemaker.
a) The rehabilitation illusion. Early on, rehabilitative
maintenance seemed to be a solution that could please everyone. If
homemakers could be retrained after divorce to become self-sup-
porting, both spouses would be free to begin new lives. Everyone
would be happy-financially autonomous homemakers and their
non-supporting spouses, feminists shunning the need for male sup-
136 Samuel H. Hofstadter and Shirley R. Levittan, Alimony-A Reformulation, 7 J
Family L 51, 55 (1967).
131 In this Article, "indefinite maintenance" is used to describe what is often termed
"permanent maintenance." The word "permanent" is misleading since permanent mainte-
nance is modifiable and typically terminates upon the occurrence of certain events, such as a
woman's remarriage. See Clark, 1 Domestic Relations at 272-93 (cited in note 32).
137 UMDA § 308 Official Comment, 9A ULA 348 (West 1987). See also the UMDA Pref-
atory Note which states that "the Act does not continue the traditional reliance upon main-
tenance as the primary means of support for divorced spouses." Id at 149. But see note 32
and accompanying text. (few divorcing women have ever received maintenance).
131 See UMDA § 308(b), 9A ULA 348 (West 1987).
13, I discuss this problem in Part II.A. of this Article.
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port, and no-fault theorists advocating a clean break at divorce.
Inspired by such visions, many state legislatures soon included a
provision for rehabilitative maintenance in their no-fault
statutes. 4 '
Unfortunately, those who work with divorced homemakers
now paint a very different picture. "The saddest sight," laments
the DHN, "is the middle-aged woman who has been convinced she
should go back to school and emerges two or four years older, a
well-educated unemployable.' 141 Indeed, some DHN programs de-
cline to refer homemakers for JTPA retraining, since "even with
the training they could earn little more than on welfare.' ' 42 Thus,
in a worst-case scenario, rehabilitative maintenance may ,merely
delay a homemaker's descent into poverty. 143
Even when retraining enables a homemaker to become self-
supporting, she will probably never recapture the loss in earning
capacity resulting from time spent in homemaking. Mincer and
Polacheck report that women who remain out of the labor market
after the birth of their first child suffer a decline in earning capac-
ity of about 1.5 percent per year.14 4 Women with advanced degrees
suffer an even higher rate of depreciation. 45 Most probably, a
homemaker's income will never match that of her spouse who par-
ticipated in the job market without interruption.
In addition to its practical limitations, rehabilitative mainte-
nance unacceptably promotes a "blame-the-victim" perspective
that devalues the homemaking role. Indeed, "rehabilitation" is an
odd word choice, as if a woman were to be classed along with a
criminal who, through rehabilitation, might be able to rise from
vice to become a sound, productive citizen.
Pretending that rehabilitative maintenance can "repair" a
"damaged" woman by turning back the clock and giving her the
140 In 1971, Florida became the first state legislatively to authorize rehabilitative ali-
mony. David H. Kelsey and Patrick P. Fry, The Relationship Between Permanent and Re-
habilitative Alimony, 4 J Am Acad Matrimonial Lawyers 1, 5 (1988); 1971 Fla Laws 241
§ 10, codified at Fla Stat § 61.08 (West Supp 1992). Kelsey and Fry report that as of 1987,
at least 29 states had adopted legislation that either authorized rehabilitative alimony or
authorized consideration of the length of time needed, for education or training. 4 J Am
Acad Matrimonial Lawyers at 6.
. The Displaced Homemakers Network: The Woman It Serves, The Problems It Ad-
dresses, Its Accomplishments and Current Activities 2 (pamphlet on file with U Chi L
Rev), quoting Laurie Shields.
142 Miller, Working Paper at 11 (cited in note 49).
M" See notes 46-52 and accompanying text (most displaced homemakers live in
poverty).
1" Mincer and Polachek, Family Investments at 415 (cited in note 57).
1245 Id.
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career opportunities she had before her marriage is a cruel, if con-
venient, illusion. Not every woman "can find a nice little job and a
nice little apartment and conduct her later years as she might have
done at age 2 5 ."1- 6 As the following example indicates, entertain-
ment of this rehabilitation illusion sometimes approaches the
absurd.
b) Another Indiana story. The Indiana no-fault statute
authorizes indefinite maintenance only where a spouse: (1) is phys-
ically or mentally incapacitated, or (2) lacks "sufficient" property
and is the custodian of a child who is physically or mentally inca-
pacitated.14 7 The ordinary homemaker remains ineligible for indef-
inite maintenance, no matter how bleak her prospects for economic
self-sufficiency or how great her spouse's income. Even in the ex-
traordinary case of physical or mental incapacity of a spouse or
child, maintenance is not mandatory but depends on the discretion
of a trial court.148
Shortly after the Indiana statute was enacted, one concerned
appellate judge suggested that a long-term homemaker is incapaci-
tated by definition. "A spouse whose age, lack of education, inex-
perience and want of vocational skill or training renders him or her
only marginally able to support himself or herself might appropri-
ately be held to be 'incapacitated to the extent that the ability...
46 See Schafran, 70 Judicature at 285 (cited in note 118), quoting a New York legisla-
tor's observation of gender-bias in courts.
147 Ind Code Ann § 31-1-11.5-11(e) (West Supp 1992) provides:
(e) A court may make the following findings concerning maintenance:
(1) If the court finds a spouse to be physically or mentally incapacitated to the
extent that the ability of the incapacitated spouse to support himself is materially af-
fected, the court may find that maintenance for that spouse is necessary during the
period of incapacity, subject to further order of the court.
(2) If the court finds a spouse lacks sufficient property, including marital property
apportioned to that spouse, to provide for that spouse's needs and that spouse is the
custodian of a child whose physical or mental incapacity requires the custodian to
forego employment, the court may find that maintenance is necessary for that spouse
in an amount and for a period of time as the court deems appropriate.
(emphasis added).
Curiously, this section closely parallels § 308 of the UMDA except that the word "and"
(italicized in section (2) above) reads "or" in the UMDA. UMDA § 308(a)(2), 9A ULA 348
(West 1987). This singular change from the text of the uniform act drastically alters the
thrust of the statute.
146 Recently, an Indiana appellate court addressed a trial court's decision to deny main-
tenance to a 61-year-old disabled wife who divorced after a 35-year marriage. Axsom v Ax-
som, 565 NE2d 1097 (Ind App 1991). Ms. Axsom received $432 in monthly Social Security
disability benefits and Mr. Axsom earned approximately $1,575 per month. Id at 1098.
Stressing that the maintenance decision is discretionary, the appellate court affirmed the
trial court's decision. Id at 1099-1100.
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to support himself or herself is materially affected .... "149 Unfor-
tunately, this view was not adopted by subsequent courts.
As originally enacted, the Indiana statute contained no other
provision for maintenance. In 1984, eleven years after implement-
ing no-fault, Indiana amended its statute to authorize a discretion-
ary award of rehabilitative maintenance. 150 This amendment, how-
ever, limited rehabilitative maintenance to a two-year period,1 51
which was extended to three years in 1987.152 Because rehabilita-
tive maintenance is discretionary, not all Indiana homemakers re-
ceive even this minimal support. Recently, some Indiana trial
courts have denied rehabilitative maintenance to long-term home-
makers who cannot demonstrate that their education was inter-
rupted because of homemaking or childcare responsibilities. 153 In-
definite maintenance for the ordinary homemaker remains
prohibited. 5 4
149 Liszkai v Liszkai, 168 Ind App 532, 343 NE2d 799, 806 (1976) (Sullivan concurring).
150 Pub L No 150 § 2, 1984 Ind Acts, formerly codified at Ind Code Ann § 31-1-11.5-
11(e)(3):
After considering [the statutory factors]; a court may find that rehabilitative mainte-
nance for the spouse seeking maintenance is necessary in an amount and for a period of
time that the court considers appropriate but not to exceed two (2) years from the date
of the final decree.
151 Id.
151 Ind Code Ann § 31-1-11.5-11(e) (West Supp 1992), as added by 1987 Ind Acts 283
§4.
153 See In re Marriage of Battles, 564 NE2d 565, 567 (Ind App 1991) (affirming denial
of rehabilitative maintenance to military wife who had "substantial opportunity to complete
her college degree through university extension courses at various military bases"). See also
Dahnke v Dahnke, 535 NE2d 172, 174-75 (Ind App 1989) (reversing trial court denial of
rehabilitative maintenance to mother of three children who began college after 14-year
marriage).
15, Professor Joan Krauskopf has recently noted an appellate trend "to preserve indefi-
nite alimony by curbing the excesses of rehabilitative alimony." Joan M. Krauskopf, Reha-
bilitative Alimony: Uses and Abuses of Limited Duration Alimony, 21 Family L Q 573, 573
(1988). Included in her exhaustive list of cases is In re Marriage of Dillman, 478 NE2d 86
(Ind App 1985), an Indiana case in which the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a
trial court's denial of indefinite maintenance to "a middle-aged delicatessen worker with
angina, dizziness, chronic lung disease and recurrent fainting spells." Id at 89. The appellate
court was able to reverse that denial, however, only because the trial court made the un-
usual statement that Indiana law required it to reach an unfair result, a statement that
suggested a failure to exercise discretion. Id at 88. Speaking for the appellate court, Judge
Young then reiterated the Indiana position that even if the trial court were to find, on
remand, an incapacity that materially affected a spouse's ability to support herself, mainte-
nance would not be mandatory. Id at 87. More recently, an Indiana appellate court affirmed
a denial of indefinite maintenance after a 35-year marriage to a 61-year-old wife who was
receiving Social Security disability benefits. Axsom, 565 NE2d at 1099-1100. One hopes that
Professor Krauskopf is correct in noting a trend toward indefinite alimony, but Indiana
decisions do not evidence such a trend.
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Indiana offers a disturbing example of a no-fault maintenance
statute that carries the preference for short-term maintenance to
an extreme. Equally disturbing is the more typical no-fault statute
that authorizes maintenance for longer periods, but ultimately
leaves the maintenance decision to the broad discretion of a trial
court.
2. Deferring to discretion.
Most no-fault statutes, unlike Indiana's, give a trial court dis-
cretion to award indefinite maintenance to a spouse in need. Sec-
tion 308(a) of the UMDA, for example, provides that a court
"may" award maintenance to a spouse who "(1) lacks sufficient
property to provide for his reasonable needs; and (2) is unable to
support himself through appropriate employment or is the custo-
dian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropri-
ate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside
the home." 155
Once need is established, however, the amount of any mainte-
nance award is left to the discretion of a judge who must "con-
sider" certain listed factors. Section 308(b) of the UMDA, for ex-
ample, authorizes a court to order maintenance "in amounts and
for periods of time the court deems just, without regard to marital
misconduct," after considering the following factors:
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance;
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or train-
ing to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropri-
ate employment;
(3) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the age and the physical and emotional condition of the
spouse seeking maintenance; and
(6) the ability of the [paying] spouse ... to meet his needs
while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.156
Not surprisingly, the broad judicial discretion conferred by
section 308 and similar provisions has spawned various decisions
that bear little apparent relation to statutory language. Often, ju-
dicial application of such statutes has been surprisingly hostile to
'5 UMDA § 308(a), 9A ULA 348 (West 1987).
166 UMDA § 308(b), 9A ULA 348-49 (West 1987).
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homemakers. The courts of Minnesota provide an example of such
a hostile interpretation.
a) Judicial hostility-a Minnesota story. In 1969, Min-
nesota enacted a no-fault statute with property and maintenance
provisions similar to those of the UMDA. 157 Not surprisingly, the
Minnesota Supreme Court soon found within the new law a prefer-
ence for short-term rather than indefinite maintenance.'58 In Otis v
Otis, the court explained this preference in colorful equality
rhetoric:
In recent years, courts have retreated from traditional atti-
tudes toward spousal support because society no longer per-
ceives the married woman as an economically unproductive
creature who is "something better than her husband's dog, a
little dearer than his horse." Traditionally, spousal support
was a permanent award because it was assumed that a wife
had neither the ability nor the resources to become self-sus-
taining. However, with the mounting dissolution rate, the ad-
vent of no-fault dissolution, and the growth of the women's
movement, the focal point of spousal support determinations
has shifted from the sex of the recipient to the individual's
ability to become financially independent. This change in
focus has given rise to the concept of rehabilitative
alimony .... 159
15' Minn Stat Ann § 518.06 et seq (West 1990 & Supp 1992). Section 518.58 provides
for the distribution of property. The original version of § 518.552, enacted in 1978, gave a
trial court discretion to award maintenance after considering the following factors:
(a) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital prop-
erty apportioned to the party, and the party's ability to meet needs independently,
including the extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party
includes a sum for that party as custodian;
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party
seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(c) The standard of living established during the marriage;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
(e) The age, and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking mainte-
nance; and
(f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs while
meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
See Minn Stat Ann § 518.552, Historical and Statutory Notes (West 1990).
158 See Otis v Otis, 299 NW2d 114, 116-17 (Minn 1980).
159 Id at 116, quoting Note, Rehabilitative Spousal Support: In Need of a More Com-
prehensive Approach to Mitigating Dissolution Trauma, 12 USF L Rev 493, 494-95 (1978).
The court in Otis reasoned that "if the spouse has the capacity to make her own way
through the remainder of her life unassisted by the former husband, then the courts cannot
[60:67
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Applying this reasoning, the court affirmed an award of only
four years of maintenance to a forty-five-year-old homemaker of
twenty-four years who had not worked since the birth of the par-
ties' child, twenty-three years earlier.160 Although the parties had
substantial assets which were essentially split in half, they left the
marriage on a decidedly disparate footing. The husband, a vice-
president of a major corporation, earned over $120,000 per year
plus bonuses; with training, the wife could earn between $12,000
and $18,000 per year.16 A dissenting judge argued that Ms. Otis
should receive indefinite maintenance in view of her role in foster-
ing her husband's career,6 2 and noted her husband's insistence
that she not work while raising a family. 63
Similar applications followed Otis. In Napier v Napier, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed a temporary maintenance
award to a forty-one-year-old homemaker who had only sporadic
part-time employment during her nineteen-year marriage.' Mr.
Napier earned $53,000 per year; Ms. Napier's most recent job paid
$6.00 per hour. 165 The court declined to extend the maintenance
award notwithstanding the fact that Ms. Napier had only an "out-
moded undergraduate degree to present to potential employers"
and would "probably never achieve the salary level that she might
have had if she had been working full-time during the nineteen
years she was married.'1 66
Again in Rohling v Rohling, the Minnesota Supreme Court af-
firmed a trial court's refusal to award indefinite maintenance to a
sixty-year-old homemaker of twenty-eight years with an eighth
grade education.6 7 The court noted that although it might have
reached a different conclusion de novo, it was bound to affirm a
decision with an "acceptable basis in fact and principle." 16
require him to pay alimony other than for rehabilitative purposes." Id, quoting Roberts v
Roberts, 283 S2d 396, 397 (Fla App 1973) (emphasis supplied).
160 299 NW2d at 114-15, 117.
161 Id at 115.
162 Id at 117-18 (Otis dissenting). When Mr. Otis was interviewed for his current posi-
tion, for example, Ms. Otis was also interviewed. Id at 118.
163 Id. Mr. Otis explicitly forbade his wife from working, insisting that he was "not
going to have any wife of mine pound a typewriter." Id.
1" 374 NW2d 512 (Minn App 1985).
163 Id at 515.
166 Id at 514, 516.
167 379 NW2d 519, 524 (Minn 1986).
168 Id.
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Apparently in response to "egregious"' 169 cases such as Napier
and Rohling, the Minnesota legislature amended its statute in 1985
to direct expressly that "[n]othing in this section shall be con-
strued to favor a temporary award of maintenance over a perma-
nent award, where the factors [listed] justify a permanent
award.'17 0 As an added precaution, the legislature stated: "When
there is some uncertainty as to the necessity of a permanent
award, the court shall order a permanent award leaving its order
open for later modification.' 7' This amendment had an immediate
impact. Soon after its enactment, the Minnesota Supreme Court
reversed a trial court's refusal to award indefinite maintenance to a
fifty-six-year-old homemaker of thirty-one years.1 72
The Minnesota experience with UMDA-patterned mainte-
nance provisions is unusual, not because of the hostile interpreta-
tion of its judiciary, but because of the intervention of its legisla-
ture. Unfortunately, in many other states, courts continue to
interpret similar maintenance provisions to the disadvantage of
displaced homemakers. 173 In some states, however, appellate courts
have acted without the aid of legislation to reverse hostile trial
court application of maintenance statutes. Wisconsin provides an
encouraging example of one such state.
b) Judicial sympathy-a Wisconsin story. Wisconsin's
no-fault statute, much like the UMDA, gives a trial court broad
discretion to order maintenance after considering statutory fac-
tors. 7 4 In the landmark case of Bahr v Bahr,7 5 the Wisconsin Su-
... Robert J. Levy, A Reminiscence About the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act-And Some Reflections About its Critics and its Policies, 1991 BYU L Rev 43, 73-76
(noting the "egregious" history of maintenance in Minnesota).
170 Act of May 31, 1985, ch 266 § 52, 1985 Minn Laws 1186, 1186-87 (amending Minn
Stat § 518.552 (1984)). An earlier amendment specifically authorized "either temporary or
permanent" maintenance and directed judicial attention to a spouse's ability to become self-
supporting. Act of March 22, 1982, ch 535 § 1, 1982 Minn Laws at 989. This amendment,
however, had little impact. See Levy, 1991 BYU L Rev at 74 (cited in note 169).
.. 1985 Minn Laws 1186.
172 Nardini v Nardini, 414 NW2d 184, 197-98 (Minn 1987).
171 See, for example, Lovato v Lovato, 98 NM 11, 644 P2d 525, 527 (1982) (reducing
alimony to wife who had never worked in order to encourage her to support herself); In re
Marriage of Schlenker, 300 NW2d 164, 166 (Iowa 1981) (after 23-year marriage, wife with
no employment skills and kidney disorder awarded alimony for only two years).
"" Wis Stat Ann § 767.26 (West 1981). These factors are:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
(3) The division of property made under section 767.255.
(4) The educational level of each party at the time of marriage and at the time the
action is commenced.
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preme Court interpreted this statute to require a trial court to be-
gin the maintenance evaluation "with the proposition that the
dependent partner may be entitled to fifty percent of the total
earnings of both parties."'176 This fifty-fifty starting point enabled
the court to reverse an award of only $1,500 per month indefinite
maintenance, where the husband's annual income was $313,000
and the wife's annual income was $5,000 or less.17 More recently,
the fifty-fifty starting point enabled a Wisconsin appellate court to
reverse an order requiring a cardiovascular surgeon to pay only 4.6
percent of his income as maintenance to his homemaking wife.178
While the Wisconsin courts' attempts to deal fairly with
homemakers are encouraging, many other courts remain reluctant
to follow suit. So long as no-fault statutes give trial courts virtually
unfettered discretion to deny or severely limit maintenance, some
trial courts will continue to subject homemakers to unrealistic and
gender-biased notions of equity. The mistaken assumption that
only a one-time division of traditional marital property can achieve
equity compounds this problem of broad judicial discretion. In its
eagerness to afford spouses the supposed psychological and eco-
nomic benefits of a clean break, no-fault overlooks the reality of
the sexual division of labor in the home and the cost of that divi-
sion of labor to the homemaker in the marketplace. The economic
(5) The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance, including educational back-
ground, training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from the job
market, custodial responsibilities for children and the time and expense necessary to
acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to find appropriate
employment.
(6) The feasibility that the party seeking maintenance can become self-supporting at a
standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage, and, if
so, the length of time necessary to achieve this goal.
(7) The tax consequences to each party.
(8) Any mutual agreement made by the parties before or during the marriage, accord-
ing to the terms of which one party has made financial or service contributions to the
other with the expectation of reciprocation or other compensation in the future, where
such repayment has not been made, or any mutual agreement made by the parties
before or during the marriage concerning any arrangement for the financial support of
the parties.
(9) The contribution by one party to the education, training, or increased earning
power of the other.
(10) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine to be
relevant.
For an examination of the history of no-fault divorce in Wisconsin, see generally Fineman,
1983 Wis L Rev at 833-86 (cited in note 43).
... 107 Wis 2d 72, 318 NW2d 391 (1982).
176 Id at 398.
177 Id at 393-98.
178 Hubert v Hubert, 159 Wis 2d 803, 465 NW2d 252, 259-60 (Wis App 1990).
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catastrophe this oversight has produced for homemakers has in-
spired a number of theorists to look beyond band-aid solutions for
a new theoretical basis for maintenance.
III. THE QUEST FOR A CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR MAINTENANCE
Because homemaking is traditionally a female role, the search
for a conceptual basis for maintenance is largely a search for a rea-
son to require a husband to share post-divorce income with a wife
who has served as primary caretaker. The financial vulnerability of
a homemaker cannot alone provide a basis for maintenance. Be-
cause a husband who pays maintenance will have fewer resources
for himself,19 basic fairness counsels against an unreasoned leap
from identification of a wife's need to a conclusion that her ex-
husband should fulfill that need. Maintenance requires a sound
theoretical basis. Identification of this basis depends on an under-
standing of the marriage relationship.
A. The Search Thus Far
The search for a conceptual understanding of marriage is as
old as Blackstone's comment in 1765 that "the husband and wife
are one person in law"180 and as new as the current effort of the
American Law Institute to formulate a set of principles to guide
family law.
1. The historical struggle-Marriage as contract or status?
Early efforts to identify the nature of the marriage relation-
ship focused on whether marriage is a contract or a status."8 At
the heart of this dispute lay the very practical question of who
should fix the terms of the relationship-the parties, the church, or
179 A husband's resources may be further tapped by his duty to pay child support if he
is not the custodial parent. Such a duty would arise independently of the duty to pay main-
tenance to his spouse, although each obligation affects the other since income is finite.
These issues of child support and child custody are beyond the scope of this Article. For a
discussion of the ways in which custody decisionmaking disadvantages women, see Fineman,
The Illusion of Equality at 79-143 (cited in note 13).
180 William M. Blackstone, 1 Commentaries *442. Restated in contemporary terms, the
common law position was that "husband and wife were one person and that person was the
husband." Harry D. Krause, Family Law: Cases, Comments and Questions 175 (West, 3d ed
1990).
"' This issue sometimes sparked heated debate. See, for example, Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of Right 32 (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952) ("To subsume
marriage under the concept of contract is thus quite impossible; this subsumption-though
shameful is the only word for it-is propounded in Kant's Philosophy of Law.")
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the state. The state ultimately won. As the U.S. Supreme Court
observed in 1888, "[m]arriage as creating the most important rela-
tion in life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization of
a people than any other institution," is "something more than a
mere contract. ' 182 Marriage, the Court concluded, "is, rather, a so-
cial relation, like that of parent and child, the obligations of which
arise not from the consent of concurring minds, but are the crea-
tion of the law itself .... "183
This view of marriage as something more than a purely con-
sensual relationship afforded the necessary basis for extensive state
regulations. Such regulations prescribed the age, race, sex, and
number of marital partners, the incidents of solemnization and li-
censing, and the rights and obligations of the parties. 84 Even the
parties' ability to terminate their relationship was strictly regu-
lated through laws that limited divorce to cases of serious marital
fault. 8 5 Very little was left to party autonomy.
In the years following World War I, traditional reverence for
the institution of marriage began to yield to a new emphasis on
individual fulfillment. 8 6 This new emphasis seemed at odds with
extensive state regulation of marriage, and seemed especially in-
consistent with fault-based divorce laws, which often limited indi-
vidual choice. 87 This uneasy tension, together with the equality
rhetoric of the emerging women's movement, signalled the need for
a new model of marriage.
182 Maynard v Hill, 125 US 190, 205, 210-11 (1888). See also Low v Peers, Wilmot 364,
371, 97 Eng Rep 138, 141 (Ex Ch 1770) (observing that marriage was "one of the first com-
mands given by God to mankind after the Creation, repeated again after the Deluge, and
ever since echoed, by the voice of Nature, to all mankind").
183 Maynard, 125 US at 211.
184 See Friedrich v Katz, 34 NY2d 987, 360 NYS2d 415, 318 NE2d 606, 606 (NY App
Div 1974) (minimal age and parental consent); Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1, 10-11 (1967)
(same race), overruling Loving v Commonwealth, 206 Va 924, 147 SE2d 78 (1966); Baker v
Nelson, 191 NW2d 185, 187 (Minn 1972) (different sexes); Reynolds v United States, 98 US
(8 Otto) 145, 161-68 (1878) (one spouse at a time); Larson v Larson, 42 IMl App 2d 467, 192
NE2d 594, 597-98 (1963) (solemnization and licensing); and Carabetta v Carabetta, 182
Conn 344, 438 A2d 109, 110-15 (1980) (solemnization and licensing). For a general discus-
sion of state regulation of marriage, see Krause, Family Law ch 1 (cited in note 180). For a
discussion of the prohibition against same-sex marriages, see Mary Patricia Treuthart,
Adopting a More Realistic Definition of "Family", 26 Gonzaga L Rev 91 (1990/91).
185 For a discussion of the history of divorce laws, see O'Connell, 23 New England L
Rev at 444-71 (cited in note 31).
1ss Id at 475-83. For a discussion of the declining importance of family during this pe-
riod and later, see generally Mary Ann Glendon, The New Family and the New Property
(Butterworths, 1981).
18I See notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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2. The UMDA model-The birth of partnership marriage.
The UMDA response to the old debate over contract and sta-
tus was to define marriage as a "personal relationship between a
man and a woman arising out of a civil contract to which the con-
sent of the parties is essential." '188 This definition of marriage as a
status arising out of a contract seems to incorporate rather than
resolve the contract-status debate. More helpful is the drafters'
brief reference, in a prefatory note, to a partnership model for di-
vorce. 89 Though its rationale is not clearly articulated, the UMDA
suggests a view of marriage as a consensual relationship, the disso-
lution of which, in the absence of an agreement otherwise,190
should be governed by legislatively-supplied rules similar to those
of partnership law.
At the core of this partnership model are two simple concepts:
divorce should be available at will; and divorce should terminate
the parties' mutual responsibilities, thus affording each party an
emotional and financial clean break. Adherence to this clean-break
principle of partnership law, however, without regard to related
partnership principles essential to its fair application, made di-
vorce a financial disaster for homemakers. The partnership model
for marriage soon became a convenient scapegoat.
Contemporary theorists attacked the partnership metaphor for
its failure to provide a conceptual basis for maintenance,' 9' its mis-
characterization of marriage as "profit-seeking,' ' 92 its hidden bias
188 UMDA § 201, 9A ULA 160 (West 1987). That section further states: "A marriage
licensed, solemnized, and registered as provided in this Act is valid in this State. A marriage
may be contracted, maintained, invalidated, or dissolved only as provided by law." Id. The
drafters' comment explains that this section "emphasizes the legal concept of marriage as a
civil contractual status, in distinction from any religious significance also attached thereto."
Id at 161.
189 UMDA, Prefatory Note, 9A ULA 149 (West 1987). The Note states, in pertinent
part: "The distribution of property upon the termination of a marriage should be treated, as
nearly as possible, like the distribution of assets incident to the dissolution of a partner-
ship." Id. Reference to a partnership model of marriage does not otherwise appear in the
text or comments of the UMDA.
19 See UMDA § 307, 9A ULA 238 (West 1987) (Alternative A) (recognizing, by implica-
tion, the validity of premarital agreements).
1"1 Professor Ira Mark Ellman, for example, maintains that partnership law authorizes
post-dissolution compensation only where the dissolution is "wrongful" or where a partner
has provided either extraordinary or inadequate service. EUman, 77 Cal L Rev at 35-40
(cited in note 54). He concludes that "[p]artnership makes no provision for alimony." Id at
35. See also Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce, in Divorce Re-
form 130, 140 (cited in note 41) ("under the partnership analogy there would be no spousal
support"). But see Section II.B. for an explanation of how partnership law does provide a
conceptual basis for maintenance.
12 See EUman, 77 Cal L Rev at 33 (cited in note 54).
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against women,' 93 and its failure to recognize the different ways in
which a business partnership and a marital relationship com-
mence."" Those theorists who rejected the partnership model, to-
gether with those who tacitly dismissed it, launched a search for a
framework that would provide a conceptual foundation for
maintenance.
3. Post-UMDA models-The return to contract.
In the twenty years since promulgation of the UMDA, the be-
lief that a partnership model provides no satisfactory basis for
maintenance has spawned numerous inquiries. Many of these in-
quiries look to contract for a theoretical basis for maintenance,
though without expressly advocating a pure contract model of
marriage.'95
a) Protecting contractual interests. The inquiries of
post-UMDA theorists have produced several frameworks for main-
tenance that rest ultimately on one or more of the traditional con-
tract interests of restitution, reliance, and expectation.' Several
of these inquiries into contract have laid important groundwork for
a new conceptual basis for maintenance. None, however, has ade-
quately explained and quantified maintenance for the typical wife,
whose primary caretaking responsibilities during marriage restrict
z" See O'Connell, 23 New England L Rev at 497-98 (cited in note 31). Professor
O'Connell reasons that if each partner walks away from a business partnership with 50% of
the assets, theoretically each has an equal opportunity for future success. In contrast, a
woman usually does not leave a marriage with an equal opportunity for future success. Data
suggest that she is economically damaged by participation in a failed marriage. Id at 497 n
342. See also Fineman, The Illusion of Equality at 176 (cited in note 13) ("As it currently
stands, the partnership concept of sharing responsibility and contribution is typically trans-
lated into assuming equal economic responsibility after divorce, a result that is unrealistic,
even cruel, given the material situation of many women.").
... Professor Mary Ann Glendon, for example, observes that while business partners
typically negotiate a general agreement governing the terms of the partnership, including
dissolution, marriage partners relegate the crucial terms of partnership to tacit assumption.
Glendon, The New Family at 65 (cited in note 87).
"" Although Professor Marjorie Shultz has made a persuasive argument for conceptual-
izing marriage as contract, her effort does not focus on the efficacy of such a model for
addressing income disparity on divorce. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering
of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 Cal L Rev 204 (1982).
"' Traditionally, these three remedies have been used to accomplish the following
goals: restore any benefit conferred by an injured party (restitution); return an injured party
to the position it would have held had the contract not been made (reliance); and give an
injured party the benefit of its bargain (expectation). See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts §
12.1 at 151-52 (Little, Brown, 1990).
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her career opportunities and advancement, thus limiting her post-
divorce income potential.
(1) A restitution model. The simplest basis for
maintenance is a restitution model. The classical contract remedy
of restitution protects a promisee's "interest in having restored to
him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party.'1 97 Resti-
tution thus prevents unjust enrichment by requiring a party in
breach to disgorge any benefit conferred by the other party.198
When applied to the marital relationship, the goal of restitu-
tion easily supports a rule requiring one spouse to reimburse the
other for financial contributions. 199 A wife who has financed the
cost of her husband's education, for example, would be reimbursed
for the sums she contributed to his tuition, books, and laboratory
fees.200 Such a limited payback, however, grossly undercompen-
sates a wife when both spouses expected a high rate of return on
their joint investment. A medical education, for example, is worth
much more than tuition and laboratory fees. This backward focus
on contribution rather than expected return, however, is the es-
sence of the restitution interest.
An expanded restitution model could include intangible, non-
market contributions associated with caretaking to compensate a
wife more fairly for benefits she conferred on her husband. This
approach, however, raises serious problems of valuation. Attempts
to quantify the value of caretaking are troublesome both in their
entertainment of the fiction that these contributions have an ob-
jective, marketable value and in the litigation costs generated by
the need to determine the kind, extent, and value of benefits con-
ferred in a specific case.21 Moreover, one theorist claims that these
"ordinary" marital benefits are not properly recoverable under a
197 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344(c) (1979).
298 See Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.1 at 151 (cited in note 196).
199 See, for example, Leonard Charles Schwartz, Divorce and Earning Ability, 1982 De-
troit Coll L Rev 69, 76.
200 Some states, by statute, protect a spouse's restitution interest by requiring reim-
bursement for contributions to education. See, for example, Ind Code Ann § 31-1-11.5-11(d)
(West Supp 1992).
201 For an attempt to avoid this valuation problem by basing a homemaker's recovery
on the percentage of homemaking chores undertaken, rather than their value, see Comment,
Contracting for Security: Paying Married Women What They've Earned, 55 U Chi L Rev
1193, 1222-23 (1988).
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restitution model since they usually are conferred with donative
intent and are thus not unjustly retained. °2
As a practical matter, a restitution model thus serves a very
narrow function. It provides a basis for minimal maintenance and
then only where one spouse has conferred a quantifiable financial
benefit on the other, usually by underwriting the cost of education.
(2) A reliance model. A reliance model provides a
broader foundation for maintenance. This model seeks to protect a
promisee's "interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance
on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have
been in had the contract not been made. ' 20 3 A reliance remedy
thus protects the party who has "changed position in reliance on
the contract by incurring expenses in preparation or in
performance. '20 4
An unsettled issue in contract law today is whether recovery
based on reliance may sometimes include opportunity costs, i.e.,
damages based on opportunities lost because of reliance on a
promise.20 5 For example, an employee who accepts full-time em-
ployment with one employer cannot accept full-time employment
with a second employer. If the first employer breaks the contract,
the employee might claim damages based on loss of the opportu-
nity to work for the second employer. Damages based on opportu-
nity costs "attempt to put the injured party in the position in
which that party would have been had that party made the best
alternative contract to the one that was broken."20 6 While inclusion
of lost opportunities in reliance damages has intrigued contracts
scholars, courts have largely ignored them.207 Nevertheless, oppor-
tunity costs have become a favorite rationale of those in search of a
theoretical basis for maintenance.
In its narrowest form, a model based on lost opportunities ex-
plains maintenance for purposes of rehabilitation. Rehabilitative
maintenance aims to compensate a spouse for the lost opportunity
"' See Ellman, 77 Cal L Rev at 24-27 (cited in note 54). Under this reasoning, only
benefits extraordinary enough to suggest non-donative intent would be reimbursed. See id
at 26-27. Distinguishing extraordinary benefits from merely ordinary ones is, of course, no
easy task and would invite a court to depend upon "its own sense of the obligations and
claims necessarily flowing from marriage." Id at 27.
203 Restatement § 344(b) (cited in note 197).
'0 Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.1 at 149 (cited in note 196).
205 See id § 12.16a at 266-71.
' Id at 267.
207 See id.
1993]
HeinOnline -- 60 U. Chi. L. Rev.  111 1993
The University of Chicago Law Review
to prepare for remunerative employment. Its goal is thus limited to
the training or education of a spouse who seeks to enter the job
market for the first time or after a period of nonremunerative em-
ployment.20 Rehabilitative maintenance makes no attempt to re-
imburse a spouse for the lost opportunity to make an uninter-
rupted, non-distracted, long-term investment in employment. A
rehabilitation model thus contemplates only short-term mainte-
nance and fails to reimburse fully a spouse for her reliance on the
marital relationship or the loss of her pre-marital opportunities.
A more generous model based on lost opportunities might seek
to compensate a spouse fully by placing her in her pre-marital po-
sition and compensating her for all opportunities lost in reliance
on the marriage relationship. 0 9 Maintenance in such cases would
recompense the homemaker whose career opportunities and ad-
vancement were limited because of caretaking responsibilities.
Such an approach faces practical roadblocks. Most obviously, it is
difficult to identify the comparative baseline of a spouse's "best
alternative contract." 210 If she had not married her husband, would
a wife have remained single? Would she have become a secretary, a
law professor, or a neurosurgeon? Would she have married a secre-
tary, a law professor, or a neurosurgeon? Would an alternative hus-
band have forbidden her to work, encouraged her career, or been
208 See UMDA § 308(b)(2), 9A UTLA 348 (West 1987) (trial court ordering maintenance
should consider "the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the
party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment").
209 See Margaret F. Brinig and June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and
Divorce, 62 Tulane L Rev 855 (1988). Professors Brinig and Carbone reason: "In modern
marriages the reliance interest has become more complex. It embraces a lost opportunity to
marry someone else, valued differently for different people during different times during the
marriage, together with the sacrifices in career development that would never have been an
issue in a society of single career families." Id at 881. See also Kay, Beyond No-Fault at 33-
34 (cited in note 89) (suggesting recognition of wife's loss of earning capacity combined with
reimbursement alimony).
21 See the definition of lost opportunity at text accompanying notes 205-07. Professor
Ellman has suggested that lost opportunities might be measured by the difference between a
woman's actual earning capacity when the marriage ends and the earning capacity she
would have achieved if she had remained single. See Ellman, 77 Cal L Rev at 54 (cited in
note 54). This measure would not, however, avoid the troublesome problems of speculation.
As Professor Ellman concedes, "determining the earning capacity she would have had may
be very difficult. In fact, in some sense it is impossible even in theory, as is any 'might have
been.'" Id at 78. "In the end," Professor Ellman concludes, "precision is not obtainable.
The determination of alimony claims, even more than most legal questions, will necessarily
depend, at least in part, upon the rough justice of trial judge discretion." Id at 80. For a
discussion of the dangers inherent in such judicial discretion, see text accompanying notes
155-73. For an argument that Professor Ellman's model is actually grounded in restitution
principles, see June Carbone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention of Alimony: A
Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 Vand L Rev 1463, 1471-85 (1990).
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indifferent to her aspirations? Would she have remained married
indefinitely? Such endless speculation dooms any effort to measure
actual lost opportunities. Therefore, although a reliance model
may help in identifying circumstances in which maintenance seems
appropriate, it offers little guidance in measuring loss.
(3) An expectation model. Another model, based on
the expectation interest, comes from human capital theorists.""1 A
favorite measure of recovery in contract, expectation protects a
party's "interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put
in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract
been performed. '212
When applied to marriage, expectation is measured by a wife's
expected return on her investment in the human capital of her
husband. Professor Joan Krauskopf explains that investments in
human capital are "[e]xpenditures to acquire or to increase a per-
son's skills or knowledge that lead to increased future productiv-
ity."' Marriage offers a classic illustration of such an investment
in human capital when a wife supports her husband while he ob-
tains a professional education, a scenario addressed by most writ-
ing on this theory. In such a case, the marital unit makes an in-
vestment. The wife finances her husband's education, often in
combination with homemaking and child care, foregoing possible
opportunities to increase her own human capital through educa-
tional investment; the husband invests in his own human capital,
foregoing possible opportunities for remunerative employment
"I Human capital concepts, which date to the time of Plato, have enjoyed great popu-
larity among economists since the early 1960s. Krauskopf, 28 Kan L Rev at 381 (cited in
note 96). Theorists who advocate the application of human capital concepts to marriage
include: Deborah A. Batts, Remedy Refocus: In Search of Equity in "Enhanced Spouse!
Other Spouse" Divorce, 63 NYU L Rev 751 (1988); Elizabeth S. Beninger and Jeanne Wie-
lage Smith, Career Opportunity Cost: A Factor in Spousal Support Determination, 16
Family L Q 201 (1982); E. Raedene Combs, The Human Capital Concept as a Basis for
Property Settlement at Divorce, 2 J Divorce 329 (1979); Krauskopf, 28 Kan L Rev 379
(cited in note 96); Elisabeth M. Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J Legal Stud 35 (1978);
and Allen M. Parkman, The Recognition of Human Capital as Property in Divorce Settle-
ments, 40 Ark L Rev 439 (1987). Not all of these theorists advocate human capital theory as
a basis for maintenance. For example, Professors Parkman and Combs urge that human
capital is property that should be valued and divided like other marital property on divorce.
See Parkman, 40 Ark L Rev at 440-41 (income stream expected for future services is an
asset, like a house); Combs, 2 J Divorce at 333 (earning ability is an asset to be divided).
III Restatement § 344(a) (cited in note 197). A noneconomic model based on expecta-
tion might support an equal division of post-divorce income. Such a model, designed
straightforwardly to encourage sharing in marriage, is offered by Professor Jane Rutherford,
Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 Fordham L Rev 539, 578 (1990).
'"' Krauskopf, 28 Kan L Rev at 381 (cited in note 96).
1993]
HeinOnline -- 60 U. Chi. L. Rev.  113 1993
The University of Chicago Law Review
during his education.214 The parties expect that the marital unit
will enjoy a return on this investment, though only the husband
recognizes a greatly enhanced earning capacity. If the parties di-
vorce, human capital theorists contend that the wife should receive
a return on her investment.
Although human capital theory's emphasis on reimbursement
for capital contributions suggests restitution, and although its lost-
opportunity focus suggests reliance, its preferred measure of recov-
ery clearly marks this theory as one based on expectation.2115 As
Professor Krauskopf counsels, "[i]n determining the amount of the
award, the court should consider not only restitution for the mone-
tary contribution, but also fulfillment of the expectation of return
in proportion to the amount of investment."21 She would calculate
the award based on "the amount of capitalized earnings attributa-
ble to the additional education. 217 This forward focus defines the
traditional contract interest of expectation.
Human capital theory improves on reliance theory by offering
not only a means of identifying appropriate cases for maintenance
but also the practical tools for measuring an award. Human capital
theorists, however, tend to focus on the extraordinary case rather
than the ordinary one. These theorists often offer human capital
theory as a solution to the problem of a spouse who finances her
husband's professional education and then is divorced before that
education begins to generate enhanced earnings. The notion of an
investment in human capital, however, need not be restricted to
these extraordinary cases. Indeed, one of the earliest proponents of
human capital theory in marriage, Professor Elisabeth Landes, laid
the groundwork for a much broader view of investment.218
214 See id at 384, 387. Such an investment ifi a graduate degree may be intrinsically
enjoyable, on net, for the student, but far less so for the spouse supporting the student.
215 That human capital theory contains elements of all three of the traditional contract
remedies is evidenced by Professor Krauskopf's statement that "[traditional legal princi-
ples of honoring expectations of return [expectancy interest] for investment [reliance inter-
est] and of preventing unjust enrichment [restitution interest] apply to the dissolution of a
marriage in which one spouse has invested in the other spouse's education." Id at 416.
21 Id at 417 (emphasis added).
217 Id at 382.
218 Landes, 7 J Legal Stud at 40 (cited in note 211). Professor Landes reasoned that
"[b]y spending time in household pxoduction, a wife directly frees some of her husband's
time to the market, increasing both his current market earnings and his incentive to invest
in earnings-augmenting skills." Id. See also Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests, in Di-
vorce Reform 130, 159-60 (cited in note 191) (offering a model based on "merger over time"
in which the longer parties are married, "the more their human capital should be seen as
intertwined rather than affixed to the individual spouse in whose body it resides"). A model
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While many of the models developed over the past twenty
years explain maintenance in certain circumstances, none has pro-
vided a satisfactory foundation for maintenance for the ordinary
homemaker whose primary caretaking responsibilities preclude or
limit her participation in the job market, thereby restricting devel-
opment of her human capital. A better model is needed. The re-
peated focus of theorists on contract interests suggests that a new
search might well begin by asking why these theorists have advo-
cated contract measures of loss while shunning straightforward
adoption of a contract model, and whether such a model would of-
fer a better basis for maintenance than a piecemeal application of
contract principles.
b) Shunning a contract model. The reluctance of many
theorists to view marriage as a contract seems curiously inconsis-
tent with the recent trend toward recognizing and enforcing pre-
nuptial agreements, 19 and with the emerging literature on rela-
tional contract theory.220 This resistance to contract seems to stem
largely from a series of misperceptions and negative images of
contract.
for maintenance based on Landes's expansive view of investment in human capital, and
grounded in an analogy to partnership law, is presented in Part IV of this Article.
219 See generally Ellman, Kurtz, and Bartlett, Family Law at 661-67 (cited in note 32).
The seminal case recognizing a premarital agreement is Posner v Posner, 257 S2d 530 (Fla
1972). In 1983, a Uniform Premarital Agreement Act ("UPAA") was promulgated that al-
lows spouses to contract concerning maintenance and any other matter "not in violation of
public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty." UPAA § 3, 9B ULA 373 (West
1987).
220 Relational theory rejects the classical view of a contract as a discrete transaction
"entirely separate not only from all other present relations but from all past and future
relations as well." Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Rela-
tions Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw U L Rev 854, 856
(1978). Relational theorists stress that a contractual relationship is fundamentally rooted in
society. See Ian R. Macneil, The New Social Contract 14-15 (Yale, 1980). Contracts, espe-
cially long-term contracts, thus depend to a large degree on external, social standards that
can be used to fill gaps in the parties' agreement. Relational contract theory therefore seems
to embrace a view of marriage as both status and contract-external standards usually fix
the terms of the relationship that begins through mutual consent, a view strikingly similar
to the UMDA conceptualization of marriage as a relationship springing from a contract. See
note 188 and accompanying text. See also Krause, Family Law at 92 (cited in note 180)
("Marriage is a contract and a status ... [M]arriage is a contract in the sense that it is
entered into somewhat like a contract and that, at least to some extent, it may be modified
by the parties' private contract. The marriage relationship is a "status" because a large set
of rules is thrust upon the spouses without their specific agreement.").
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Contract is sometimes thought to be too crass or too masculine
a model for a relationship as venerable as marriage.2 21 Viewing an
ongoing marriage as a purely contractual relationship might be
said to promote an alienated, cynical view of marriage that debases
its intimate nature. Defining marriage as a contract, however,
hardly accomplishes this insidious result. A contract is simply a
consensual relationship grounded in an exchange of promises,22 or
mutual commitments,223 a definition that accurately, if generally,
describes the marital relationship. Once a contract is formed, the
law usually seeks to protect the parties' expectations rather than to
compel them to perform their promises,2 24 a focus consistent with
protection of the spouses' financial expectations while authorizing
divorce at will. At least in these fundamental ways, contract thus
reflects rather than debases normative views of marriage.
Additional reluctance to view marriage as a contract stems
from fear that recognizing intimate contracts governing ongoing
marriages would flood the courts with actions to enforce the de-
tailed terms of such contracts.22 5 However, because spouses, like
parties to a commercial contract, rarely attempt to detail the terms
221 See Maynard, 125 US at 205, 211 (marriage is more than a "mere" contract; it cre-
ates the most important relation in life). See also James C. Foster, Antigones in the Bar:
Woman Lawyers as Reluctant Adversaries, 10 Legal Stud F 287, 288 (1986) ("The quintes-
sential male world of law [is] profoundly shaped by formal-rational, contractarian ... un-
derpinnings of American social reality, and... by the psycho-sexual roots of patriarchy.").
222 See Farnsworth, Contracts § 1.1 at 4 (cited in note 196) .(defining a contract as "a
promise or set of promises, that the law will enforce or at least recognize in some way").
223 See Restatement § 2(1) (cited in note 197) (defining promise as "a manifestation of
intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so as to justify a promisee in
understanding that a commitment has been made").
224 See generally Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.1 (cited in note 196).
225 Professor Weitzman is the primary advocate of express intimate agreements con-
cerning day-by-day conduct during marriage. See Lenore J. Weitzman, The Marriage Con-
tract 227-54 (Free Press, 1981). Such domestic contracting, argues Weitzman, allows parties
to tailor the terms of their relationship to meet their individual needs and values. Id at xxi.
For a criticism of Weitzman's position based on its alleged tendency to promote litigation,
see Marsha Garrison, Marriage: The Status of Contract, 131 U Pa L Rev 1039, 1053 (1983)
(reviewing Weitzman, The Marriage Contract).
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of their daily interactions,"2 ' enforcement of intimate contracts is
largely a mythical problem.2 27
Most importantly, a contract model for marriage has been re-
jected because it allegedly offers no basis for maintenance. Profes-
sor Ira Mark Ellman, for example, reasons that a contract model
contradicts the concept of no-fault, since it would require concep-
tualizing maintenance as an award of damages for breach.228 While
it is true that maintenance cannot be analogized to damages for
breach of contract if the spirit of no-fault is to be honored, dam-
ages are not the only obligation that may arise when a contractual
relationship ends. In some cases, parties may expressly agree that
termination triggers a duty of alternative performance, such as a
buyout, quite apart from damages.22 9 In the absence of an express
agreement requiring a buyout, such a duty may be imposed by
statute.230 In other cases, a court may impose a duty to pay money
that is based not on breach, but on notions of justice and fair
I'l Spouses fail to detail the terms of their ongoing relationship or to enter prenuptial
agreements governing its termination for many of the same reasons that parties to commer-
cial contracts fail to do so. For example, parties sometimes may fail to foresee an event. At
other times, they may foresee it, but may believe it is unlikely to arise. Or, they may be
reluctant to raise a matter, especially a delicate one, that may result in delay, disclosure of
facts they prefer to keep secret, addition of an unfavorable provision, or even the loss of the
contract. See Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.15 at 299-300 (cited in note 196). Finally, parties
may fail to negotiate terms because they are confident the law will supply them if they are
needed. Id. In the case of marriage, the reluctance of most spouses to enter such intimate
contracts suggests a view that it might be better to rely on the courts for fair allocation,
rather than to engage in quasi-adversarial bargaining with the spouse to whom one may
currently be deeply devoted.
227 Even if detailed intimate contracts become more popular, courts might decline to
entertain actions for enforcement of details on the ground that public policy necessitates
limiting indiscriminate access to the courts. Public policy has long been recognized as a
legitimate basis for curtailing party autonomy, even in clearly recognized contractual rela-
tionships. See Farnsworth, Contracts §§ 5.2-5.4 (cited in note 196). See also Arthur Linton
Corbin, 6A Corbin on Contracts § 1373-78 (West, 1962).
"0 Ellman, 77 Cal L Rev at 16 (cited in note 54). Professor Ellman suggests that the
contract model may simply be a guise for reintroducing fault into divorce proceedings. Id at
23-24.
229 For example, sports contracts and partnership agreements may contain buyout
clauses that put a price tag on a party's decision to leave the relationship. See John J.
Chapman and Arthur M. Gans, National Hockey League Contract Negotiations, in Gary A.
Uberstine, ed, The Law of Professional and Amateur Sports, 8-1, 8-10 (Clark Boardman,
1988) (standard player contract provides that a club may terminate relationship at any time
without cause by buying out the contract).
10 The Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA"), for example, sometimes requires a buyout
of the interest of a departing partner. This buyout duty is expended in recent drafts of the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA"). See RUPA § 701. In 1987, the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws appointed a Drafting Committee to revise
the UPA and named Dean Donald J. Weidner as reporter. This Article cites the October 28,
1992 draft (without comments) of RUPA and the comments to the August, 1991 draft. See
19931
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play.23 l In the case of marriage, a concern for fair play might sup-
port imposition of a duty to pay maintenance.
Such a duty to pay maintenance might be imposed through
judicial gap-filling. The failure of most spouses to enter prenuptial
agreements leaves a gap in the marriage contract as to many inci-
dents of their relationship. Contract law teaches that such gaps
may be filled in several ways. If a court is unable to massage ex-
press terms into yielding a necessary term,3 2 it may struggle to
determine the parties' supposed expectations and supply a term
implied-in-fact on this basis.233 If these efforts fail, a court may
supply a term based on the parties' hypothetical expectations-the
expectations the parties presumably would have agreed upon if
they had considered the matter.23 4 Alternatively, a court may sup-
ply a term that is "reasonable in the circumstances," 2 5 and com-
ports with "community standards of fairness and policy. 23 6 So
guided, courts generally supply terms based on a duty to act in
good'faith and in accord with general notions of fair dealing.237 In
the case of marriage, such a reasonable term might include a hus-
band's promise to pay maintenance to a wife who serves as primary
caretaker, thus providing a nurturing, non-distracting environment
UPA § 38(2), 6 ULA 456 (West 1969); UPA § 42, 6 ULA 521 (West 1969); RUPA § 701. For
a discussion of buyouts, see text accompanying notes 264-71.
231 One example is the case of a franchisor who is sometimes required to compensate a
franchisee at the end of their relationship. Such compensation is not based on breach since
the relationship is at-will, but rather on notions of fair dealing. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17
at 318, 320-22 (cited in note 196).
232 See generally id at § 7.17.
232 The search for an implied-in-fact term requires a court to speculate whether the
parties actually share a common expectation or, lacking that, whether one party had an
expectation that the other party should reasonably have known. See id. Often, this focus
induces a court to entertain the fiction that the parties agreed to a term that in fact they
never considered. In the case of marriage, such a search would be troublesome because as
long as a marriage is proceeding smoothly, most couples do not actually contemplate termi-
nation. Those who do so prior to marriage are likely to enter prenuptial agreements.
23 See Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.16 at 306 (cited in note 196). In the case of marriage,
an argument could be made that if the parties, at the time of their marriage, had contem-
plated the termination of their relationship, their presumed mutual affection would have led
them to settle on "fair" terms. See note 226 and accompanying text. By contrast, in a purely
commercial contractual relationship, self-interest, rather than fairness, may more accurately
describe the parties' hypothetical expectations.
115 Restatement § 204 (cited in note 197). See also the following gap-fillers in the Uni-
form Commercial Code: § 2-309(1) (reasonable time for performance) and § 2-305 (reasona-
ble price at time of delivery).
238 Restatement § 204, comment d (cited in note 197).
217 See id at § 205: "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and
fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." See also UCC § 1-203: "Every contract
or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or
enforcement."
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that fosters development of his human capital and limits develop-
ment of her own. Determining whether such a promise to pay
maintenance is appropriate in a specific case, and if so the amount
of such maintenance, ultimately would depend, however, on a
court's personal sense of justice and fair play.
While none of the reasons commonly offered for rejecting a
contract model is persuasive, no compelling reason exists to pro-
long the debate as part of the maintenance discourse. Treating
marriage as a contract does little more than trigger the more criti-
cal issue of whether good faith and fair dealing require mainte-
nance in a given case. A richer model is needed to identify more
precisely the circumstances in which maintenance is appropriate
and to quantify the amount of a maintenance order. The contem-
porary law of partnership provides such a model.
B. A Contemporary Model-The Maturing of Partnership
Marriage
1. An analogy-Concept, fact, and law.
A partnership model for marriage has great conceptual appeal.
The "ideal to which marriage aspires [is] that of equal partner-
ships between spouses who share resources, responsibilities, and
risks" and thus perhaps some limited duty to sacrifice for the good
of the partnership.238 This norm encourages commitments between
spouses, promotes gender equality, and supports caretaking of chil-
dren and elderly dependents.3 9 Indeed, much of the contemporary
writing on divorce reform espouses such an ideal relationship, even
when the writer declines to endorse the partnership metaphor. The
most powerful support for a partnership model thus lies in its egal-
itarian framework.
In addition to its normative appeal, support for a partnership
model can be drawn from the many de facto similarities between a
marriage and a handshake partnership. Both relationships typi-
cally commence with the exchange of commitments and without
express agreement or advice of counsel.2 40 Both relationships seek
profits, though profit in the case of marriage may be emotional,
235 Deborah L. Rhode and Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the
Reforms, in Divorce Reform 191, 199 (cited in note 41).
139 See id. Professors Rhode and Minow argue that protection for such sharing behavior
is critical in view of the lack of adequate child care and parental leave policies, flexible
scheduling, or significant part-time work. Id.
210 See Alfred F. Conard, Robert L. Knauss, and Stanley Siegel, Agency, Associations,
Employment and Partnerships 18 (Foundation, 4th ed 1987) ("The great mass of ordinary
1993]
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sexual, and perhaps spiritual as well as financial.241 Both often in-
volve a specialization of labor. Commonly, one partner contributes
capital primarily or exclusively, while another contributes services
primarily or exclusively242-a specialization that resembles a tradi-
tional marriage, as well as many contemporary ones, in which the
husband contributes income through outside employment and the
wife contributes caretaking services.243
Additional support for a partnership analogy lies in the law
governing partnerships, the Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA").
The UPA codifies the law of partnership in forty-nine states. 44
While the UPA acknowledges the consensual nature of a partner-
ship and generally defers to party autonomy, it contains several
mandatory provisions. These provisions are. as essential to a mar-
riage as to a purely commercial relationship. For example, the
UPA recognizes a broad fiduciary duty among partners, 245 a duty
consistent with the social norm of reciprocal trust and love be-
tween spouses. In another mandatory provision, the UPA recog-
partnerships are probably in that form because the parties never gave their organizational
structure much thought. Their agreements are informal, and often unwritten.").
241 The UPA § 6, 6 ULA 22 (West 1969) defines partnership as "an association of two
or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." According to UPA § 7(4), 6
ULA 39 (West 1969), evidence that a person shares profits is "prima facie evidence that he
is a partner."
The factors that induce formation of partnerships are cogently discussed in Conard,
Knauss and Siegel, Agency at 17 (cited in note 240). These factors provide an interesting
commentary on contemporary marriage:
One of the outstanding features of the organizational revolution is the impulse of peo-
ple to join in common endeavors. This impulse is commonly attributed to the desire to
pool money, resources, skills, and intelligence for greater achievements; it may also re-
spond to some less rational need for affiliation or psychic reinforcement. Modern laws
generously provide convenient receptacles for these efforts, by way of corporations for
business, religious, eleemosynary, educational or social purposes. However, millions of
people continue to pool their resources through less formal, or substantially unstruc-
tured groups. Of these, the best known to the law is the ordinary partnership.
Id.
242 See Robert W. Hamilton, Fundamentals of Modern Business § 13.3.4 at 306 (Little,
Brown, 1989).
242 This specialization may produce consequences in marriage, however, that differ from
those produced in a commercial partnership. If property is minimal, a homemaker who has
primarily contributed services to the marriage may suffer a loss resulting from her participa-
tion if the relationship ends-a consequence that is not as likely to result from service-
participation in a purely commercial partnership.
244 See Hamilton, Fundamentals § 13.3.1 at 304 (cited in note 242).
241 See id. In this regard, the influence of relational contract theory is apparent. See
note 220 and accompanying text. Under current drafts of the Revised Uniform Partnership
Act ("RUPA"), however, this fiduciary duty is a default rule rather than a mandatory one.
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nizes the broad authority of partners to bind the partnership; 46
this rule recalls the common law duty to support a spouse, which
empowered a spouse to bind a mate to repay the merchant who
supplies necessaries.2 7 Also, the UPA recognizes the unalterable
right of a partner to dissolve the partnership at any time, notwith-
standing even the most explicit agreement to the contrary. "" Such
a right is the linchpin of no-fault divorce, which authorizes divorce
at the will of either party, upon a finding that the marriage is "ir-
retrievably broken."24 9
In addition to its mandatory provisions, the UPA contains an
array of default rules that are triggered by the frequent failure of
commercial partners, like spouses, to negotiate the terms of their
relationship. 250 For example, one default provision makes partners
co-owners rather than individual owners of partnership prop-
erty,25 1 a view that mirrors the rule in many marital property stat-
utes that property acquired during marriage is presumed to be
246 Id. UPA § g(1), 6 ULA 132 (West 1969), recognizes the general ability of a partner
to bind the partnership through acts "for the purpose of its business."
247 See Clark, 2 Domestic Relations at 423-24 (cited in note 32).
248 UPA §§ 29, 31, 6 ULA 364, 376 (West 1969). See Conard, Knauss, and Siegel,
Agency at 434 (cited in note 240) ("One of the most salient characteristics of a partnership
is its impermanence-its terminability."). For a general discussion of dissolution and termi-
nation, see Harold Gill Reuschlein and William A. Gregory, The Law of Agency and Part-
nership §§ 227-42 (West, 2d ed 1990). See also Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions
Animate Revision of the Uniform Partnership Act, 46 Bus Law 427, 435-38 (1991) (analyz-
ing confusion surrounding issue of dissolution).
248 See UMDA § 302(a), 9A ULA 181 (West 1987), which requires a court to enter a
decree of dissolution of marriage if:
(2) the court finds the marriage is irretrievably broken, if the finding is supported by
evidence that (i) the parties have lived separate and apart for a period of more than
180 days next preceding the commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) there is serious
marital discord adversely affecting the attitude of one or both of the parties toward the
marriage ....
In a few states, however, no-fault divorce is available only by mutual consent. Kay, 56 U Cin
L Rev at 5-6 & n 20 (cited in note 41).
250 For a discussion of the reasons business persons and spouses often fail to negotiate
the terms of their relationship, see note 226. Under partnership law, various agreements
between partners may be made without any paper record and established through later tes-
timony. See Balafas v Balafas, 263 Minn 267, 117 NW2d 20, 24-25 (1962). In the case of
marriage, the possibility that a spouse might attempt fraudulently to establish an oral
agreement denying or limiting a buyout right raises legitimate concern. One possible answer
to this concern would be to impose a writing requirement on such an agreement. See, for
example, Uniform Marital Property Act § 10(a), 9A ULA (West 1987).
251 See UPA § 25(1)-(2), 6 ULA 326 (West 1969). See also Weidner, 46 Bus Law at 430
(cited in note 248) (describing shift away from tenancy model of co-ownership in a
partnership).
HeinOnline -- 60 U. Chi. L. Rev.  121 1993
The University of Chicago Law Review [60:67
marital property.2 5 2 The UPA default rules further provide that
"[a]U partners have equal rights in the management and conduct
of the partnership business,' ' 25 and that profits and losses are di-
vided equally.254 These concepts are consistent both with modern
equality rhetoric concerning conduct within marriage and with
community property statutes, 25 5 though perhaps they are not yet
actualized in all homes. 256
The UPA default rules governing the dissolution of a partner-
ship are especially relevant. Indeed, this aspect of partnership law
seems to have inspired the UMDA to adopt a partnership model
for divorce.257 The UPA provides that a partnership dissolves upon
the at-will departure of a partner.258 Partners who have not dis-
solved wrongfully have a right to wind-up; other partners can seek
a judicial wind-up. 259 Winding-up includes the completion of un-
finished partnership business, liquidation of assets, payment of
debts, and distribution of any remaining proceeds to the part-
ners 26-0 a process analogous to the final settlement of property
rights on divorce. As part of this process, each partner's capital
contribution is returned.261 This rule resembles many equitable
distribution statutes that require return of spouses' separate prop-
252 See generally Clark, -2 Domestic Relations at 183-90 (cited in note 32). This pre-
sumption may be rebutted by showing that the property falls within one of the exceptions
to the general rule and is therefore separate property. Separate property includes property
acquired prior to marriage, or acquired during marriage by gift, bequest, devise, or inheri-
tance. Id at 184, 186.
25 See UPA § 18(e), 6 ULA 213 (West 1969). Accord RUPA § 401(f) (October, 1992
draft).
2-5 UPA § 18(a), 6 ULA 213 (West 1969). See Conard, Knauss, and Siegel, Agency at
391 (cited in note 240).
255 Community property states make spouses co-managers of community property. See,
for example, Cal Civ Code § 5125 (West Supp 1992).
256 Dean Prager notes that it is common practice for spouses to pool property with
control in one or both spouses. Prager, Shifting Perspectives at 120 (cited in note 43). The
tendency to pool property tends to increase as family income decreases. Id at 129 n 21.
257 See text accompanying notes 33-46.
2158 See UPA §§ 31, 32, 6 ULA 376, 394 (West 1969).
259 See UPA §§ 37, 38(1), 6 ULA 444, 456 (West 1969). See also UPA § 30, 6 ULA 367
(West 1969), which distinguishes between a dissolution and a winding up: "On dissolution
the partnership is not terminated but continues until the winding up of partnership affairs
is completed." See Official Comment to UPA § 29, 6 ULA 365 (West 1969) defining "wind-
ing up" as the "process of settling partnership affairs after dissolution."
265 See Reuschlein and Gregory, Law of Agency at 345 (cited in note 248).
261 UPA § 40, 6 ULA 468-69 (West 1969), details the rules for distribution of partner-
ship property. Essentially, that section requires distributions to (1) creditors; (2) partners
for loans to the partnership; (3) partners in respect of capital; and (4) partners in respect of
profits. See Alan R. Bromberg and Larry E. Ribstein, Bromberg and Ribstein on Partner-
ship § 7.10 at 7:92 (Little, Brown, 1991). See also Reuschlein and Gregory, Law of Agency
§§ 228, 238 (cited in note 248).
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erty prior to the distribution of marital property.262 Winding-up
terminates the partners' mutual rights and obligations.63 This con-
sequence underscores the clean-break notion of no-fault divorce
statutes; the distribution of marital property marks an end to the
parties' financial entanglement, thus affording each spouse a fresh
start.
In practice, however, partnership business typically is not
wound-up, but continues after dissolution, sometimes by a new
partnership that rises from the ashes of the first.264 In a fixed-term
partnership, remaining partners may elect to continue the business
for the agreed term, provided they pay to the retiring or wrong-
fully-departing partner the value of her interest in the partner-
ship.265 This buyout right of the departing partner is usually more
valuable than the right to wind-up, because it can be realized
much more quickly and it avoids judicial reluctance to extinguish
the remaining partners' means of livelihood.
Recent drafts of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act
("RUPA")266 preserve the rule that a partner can leave the part-
nership at any time,67 but expand and detail the right of a depart-
ing partner to force a buyout rather than a winding-up. 268 Such a
22 See, for example, UMDA § 307, 9A ULA 238-39 (West 1987). Alternative A,
designed for common law states, authorizes the equitable distribution of "property and as-
sets belonging to either or both however and whenever acquired." Id at 238. Alternative A
further provides, however, that one factor to be considered in the distribution of such prop-
erty is the "contribution... of each party in the acquisition" of property. Id at 239. Alter-
native B, designed for community property states, clearly authorizes the return of "each
spouse's separate property" before community property is divided. Id.
M See Bromberg and Ribstein, Partnership § 7.08 (cited in note 261). The parties'
mutual rights and obligations are thus not terminated by the dissolution but continue until
the winding up is completed, UPA § 30, 6 ULA 367 (West 1969), which occurs when every
obligation has been discharged by performance.
"' See Donald J. Weidner, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act Midstream: Major
Policy Decisions, 21 U Toledo L Rev 825, 837 (1990).
2" The UPA specifically authorizes continuation of partnership business when a part-
ner wrongfully dissolves a partnership before expiration of a fixed term. UPA § 38(b), 6
ULA 456 (West 1969). The amount paid a wrongfully-departing partner may be offset by
damages caused by the wrongful departure and does not include the value of goodwill in the
business. Id. See also UPA § 42, 6 ULA 521 (West 1969) (rights of retiring partner or estate
of deceased partner when the business is continued).
2" See note 230 for a discussion of the origin of the RUPA. Cites to the RUPA refer to
the October 28, 1992 text (without comments) and the comments to the August 1991 draft.
267 See Comment to RUPA § 601 (August 1991 draft); RUPA § 601(1) (October 1992
draft).
208 RUPA § 801 states that a partnership dissolves and its business must be wound up
only upon the occurrence of listed events, suggesting a starting point of continuation, rather
than dissolution as under the UPA. The RUPA attempts to clarify this new rule by distin-
guishing between a "dissociation" (the departure of a partner) and a "dissolution" (the
winding up of its business and termination of a partnership). In Article 7, the RUPA details
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buyout commonly occurs when a partner dissociates before the ex-
piration of a definite term, in which case partnership business may
continue.26 9 If the business continues, the RUPA requires a buyout
of the dissociated partner's interest 270 and identifies the method
for calculating the buyout price.271
2. An application-Dissociation and buyout.
The UPA buyout rules and their expansion in the RUPA pro-
vide a useful analogy for the modern marital relationship. Contem-
porary marriage is a partnership for a term (the life of one part-
ner),27 2 although spouses, like commercial partners, have the power
to leave the relationship at any time. A spouse's decision to end
the relationship results in her dissociation, but does not necessarily
trigger a winding-up of any shared enterprise in which the spouses
have invested. If this enterprise continues, a dissociated spouse
should receive a buyout of her investment.
the effects of dissociation; in Article 8, it details the effects of dissolution. See also RUPA §
801, comment (August 1991 draft).
289 When the partnership is for a definite term, a partner's wrongful dissociation dis-
solves the partnership only upon "receipt by the partnership of notice from another partner
of that partner's express will to withdraw as a partner." RUPA § 801(2)(i). The RUPA thus
makes an important shift away from a rule of dissolution upon departure of a partner before
expiration of a term to a rule of dissolution only upon additional specified events.
270RUPA § 701(a).
271 RUPA § 701(b) states:
The buyout price of a dissociated partner's interest is the amount that would have
been distributable to the dissociating partner . . . if on the date of dissociation, the
assets of the partnership were sold at a price equal to the greater of liquidation value
or the value based on a sale of the entire business as a going concern without the
dissociated partner and the partnership were wound up as of that date. In either case,
the selling price of the partnership assets must be determined on the basis of the
amount that would be paid by a willing buyer to a willing seller, neither being under
any compulsion to buy or sell, and with knowledge of all relevant facts. Interest must
be paid from the date of dissociation to the date of payment.
This buyout price must, however, be offset by any damages for wrongful dissociation. RUPA
§ 701(c). Wrongful dissociation usually occurs when a partner leaves the partnership before
expiration of a definite term. RUPA § 602(a)(2)(i). Premature departure is also wrongful if a
partner is expelled by judicial decree upon a determination that "the partner engaged in
conduct relating to the partnership business which makes it not reasonably practicable to
carry on the business in partnership with the partner." RUPA §§ 602(a)(2)(ii), 601(5). See
also UPA § 32 (1)(d), 6 ULA 394 (West 1969).
272 The traditional vow-"until death do us part"-defines this term. Even under no-
fault, traditional marriage is not, of course, like the classical at-will relationship (which is
actually not a contract). In the paradigmatic at-will relationship, an employment arrange-
ment, either the employer or the employee may terminate the relationship at will, with no
further financial consequences. Such an arrangement more closely resembles cohabitation
than marriage.
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This reasoning raises some immediate conceptual concerns. In
the case of marriage, who should buy out whom-that is, which
spouse is the dissociated spouse? Even more fundamentally, is
there a shared enterprise that continues after divorce, thus requir-
ing the spouse who continues it to buy out the interest of the dis-
sociated spouse? The answers to these questions draw heavily on
human capital theory.2 73
Human capital theorists stress the investment of the marital
unit in the human capital of a spouse who undertakes professional
education or training to increase future productivity. 274 While
human capital theory generally focuses on cases of educational in-
vestment, a broader view of marital investment is possible.27 5 An
investment in human capital may occur simply through the expen-
diture of time and effort in the job market, which results in experi-
ence and perhaps seniority. When, for example, a husband works
outside the home and a wife works exclusively in the home, the
marital unit makes an investment in the husband's human capital
just as surely as when the husband enters college. The parties ex-
pect that this joint investment will generate a return that will be
jointly enjoyed. Although dissociation terminates the parties' rela-
tionship, it usually does not terminate this income-generating mar-
ital enterprise-which continues to function in the marketplace,
exclusively or primarily in the hands of the husband. In such cases,
the wife who has dissociated from this marital enterprise should
receive a buyout of her interest. The implications of this principle
are best explained by reference to three paradigmatic marriages:
(1) the traditional marriage, (2) the hybrid marriage, and (3) the
egalitarian marriage.
If the spouses opt for a traditional marriage in which the hus-
band works outside the home and the wife is a full-time home-
maker,276 the marital unit has invested exclusively in the husband's
human capital. 7 When the parties divorce, the husband leaves the
7 See text accompanying notes 211-18.
:74 See text accompanying note 213.
275 See note 218 and accompanying text.
278 A large number of couples still choose this option. The Bureau of Labor Statistics
reported that in 1991, approximately 16 million married women did not participate in the
labor force because they were "keeping house." Bureau of Labor Statistics at 26 (cited in
note 3).
277 While this traditional wife presumably is gradually enhancing her domestic skills
through experience, these skills have little marketable value, and in fact they may decline in
value through use (that is, as a woman ages, and thereby becomes less marriageable). See
Ellman, 77 Cal L Rev at 43-44 (cited in note 54) (citing statistics demonstrating that a
woman's marriageability diminishes with age more quickly than a man's).
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marriage with enhanced earning capacity, which is the product of a
marital investment in his human capital. 78 He thus takes the mar-
ital enterprise with him. When these traditional spouses divorce,
the wife should receive a buyout of her interest in this continuing
marital enterprise.
In a hybrid marriage, perhaps the most common of the three
paradigms, the wife assumes most of the homemaking and child-
care responsibilities, and also works outside the home, either part-
time, part-year, or full-time, often in the secondary job market.
Because of these multiple responsibilities, this wife has fewer hours
to devote to her employment than does her husband. 9 Conse-
quently, her career opportunities and advancement may be lim-
ited, resulting in income disparity between husband and wife. In
this hybrid marriage, the marital unit invests primarily in the hus-
band's human capital and secondarily in the wife's human capital.
When the wife dissociates from the marriage, she takes with her a
part of the marital enterprise, measured by her own enhanced
earnings attributable to marital investment. If she takes a smaller
portion of the marital enterprise than her spouse takes-i.e., if her
enhanced earnings are less than his-she should receive a buyout.
In an egalitarian marriage, both spouses work full-time and
each performs fifty percent of the household chores and childcare.
In such an extraordinary relationship,2 80 the marital unit makes
two equal investments-one in the human capital of the husband
and another in the human capital of the wife.28' It might therefore
278 In each of the three paradigmatic marriages discussed herein, the spouses' enhanced
earnings at the time of dissociation are assumed to be a rough estimate of the value of the
marital enterprise. In the ordinary case, such enhanced earnings are measured by calculat-
ing the difference between income at the time of marriage (in present dollars) and income at
the time of dissociation. In certain extraordinary cases, such as when a professional degree
was obtained immediately before marriage or immediately before divorce, a more sophisti-
cated measure may be required. A formula for measuring enhanced earnings is presented in
Part IV of this Article.
278 As Dean Prager explains, even when neither spouse forgoes employment to care for
children, "at least one partner must stand ready in emergencies and be flexible enough to
reclaim children when child care arrangements end .... Both are not free to travel on
business; both are not necessarily available for overtime or flexible hours. Although some
may truly try to share responsibilities for children, many will conclude that it is more func-
tional for one of them to do so." Prager, Shifting Perspectives at 119 (cited in note 43). It
would be naive to assume that the spouse who undertakes such child care responsibilities
can devote as much time and attention to her career as her spouse.
280 A truly egalitarian relationship may be unusual. See note 11 and accompanying text
(suggesting that even when women work full-time they usually undertake a disproportion-
ately large share of household responsibilities).
28 One factor that suggests these investments are equal is their equal cost to the mari-
tal unit-each spouse devotes roughly equal numbers of hours to outside/non-marital tasks.
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appear that, because the egalitarian marital unit has invested
equally in the spouses, each spouse should take one-half of the
marital enterprise upon divorce and neither should receive a
buyout.
This reasoning, however, oversimplifies the issue. Valuation of
a continuing enterprise is not based on the size of various invest-
ments, but rather on the returns on those investments.282 In mar-
riage, as in a commercial partnership, one investment may gener-
ate more income than another. Whatever the reason for this
differential, the resulting loss or gain is borne by the partnership
and not by the partners individually. When a wife dissociates from
an egalitarian marriage, she should receive a buyout if her en-
hanced earnings are less than those of her husband.
As a practical matter, if no buyout were required upon dissoci-
ation from an egalitarian marriage, the divorce proceeding could
easily degenerate into a debate over whether a wife performed fifty
percent or only forty-nine percent of caretaking responsibilities. A
husband, for example, who could prove that he matched the nine
hours each week his wife spent transporting children, the seven
hours she spent preparing meals, the 4.2 hours she spent cleaning
house, and the 5 hours she spent laundering clothes, etc. (and that
he had done so for the duration of the marriage) could avoid pay-
ing his wife a buyout no matter how disparate their enhanced
earnings. Divorce would thus raise a series of unanswerable ques-
tions: Does ten hours of vacuuming equal ten hours of watching a
little league baseball game? Ten hours of cleaning bathrooms? Ten
hours of helping children with homework? Ten hours of painting a
bedroom? And what of the husband who was a more efficient gro-
cery shopper than his wife, or the wife who more efficiently
vacuumed the house? Such a focus is ludicrous and inappropriate.
The real issue is not the identity of contribution, but the return to
the marital unit on joint investments.
3. A prediction-Ex ante effects.
Any proposal for legal reform should be tested for its ex ante
as well as its ex post impact. Thus, a law of divorce that would
Even where hours on the job equate, however, costs may differ. Consider, for example, a
case in which one spouse's job is more stressful than the other's, requiring a greater personal
investment that negatively impacts the marital unit by making that spouse less pleasant at
home.
28' See Parkman, 40 Ark L Rev at 442 (cited in note 211) ("The value of the investment
is not the expense incurred, but the returns generated.").
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require a buyout must be tested for its impact on ongoing
marriages.
a) Immediate effects. Modeling divorce after contempo-
rary partnership law probably will have minimal, if any, immediate
effect on the roles of spouses in ongoing marriages. The traditional
homemaker/breadwinner dichotomy is deeply embedded in Ameri-
can culture and has been largely unresponsive to changes in di-
vorce law. No-fault reforms, for example, have not persuaded most
women to abandon primary caretaking responsibilities, despite evi-
dence that no-fault increases both the likelihood of divorce and the
likelihood that a divorcing caretaker will suffer a financial
catastrophe.283
At times, necessity combines with the sex/gender system to
make a woman's role as homemaker virtually inescapable. For ex-
ample, the inadequacy of the American day-care system, for both
children and the aging, often necessitates that a family member
limit occupational choice and advancement in order to care for
these individuals.284 The sex/gender system usually ensures that
the wife fills the gap. Divorce law reform probably will not deter
these women from assuming a caretaking role.
A contemporary partnership model will, however, curtail a
husband's current opportunity to benefit from the birth and nur-
turance of children and then deny his wife her expected share in'
enhanced earnings. 25 Divorce reform may also ameliorate the dis-
torting effect created by divorce distribution law, which refuses to
include enhanced earnings within the definition of property, thus
providing an inefficiently strong incentive for a husband to invest
in just those non-distributable assets.
Divorce reform might also, in some cases, encourage the use of
prenuptial agreements. A man aware of buyout rules, for example,
might insist upon a prenuptial agreement before marrying a home-
282 See text accompanying notes 46-80 (chronicling the financial plight of homemakers
under no-fault). See also notes 3-13 and accompanying text.
284 "National policy toward childcare has been notable largely for its absence." Rhode,
Justice and Gender at 129 (cited in note 11). Professor Rhode cites national surveys indi-
cating that between one-quarter and one-third of interviewed mothers express dissatisfac-
tion with their child care arrangements or cite inadequate child care as a major barrier to
employment. Id at 130.
285 See Ellman, 77 Cal L Rev at 41-43 (cited in note 54) (observing that a husband
reaps the financial benefits of marriage early in the relationship when children are born and
nurtured, while a wife reaps those benefits much later when her husband's earning capacity
peaks).
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maker.28 The underutilization of prenuptial agreements today
may be partly a function of the fact that most men are adequately
protected by no-fault divorce laws and thus do not need them. If
women are culturally encouraged to adopt a more passive posture
than men, as some commentators have suggested,287 one might
suppose that women are less inclined than men to seek contractual
protection of their interests. If the tables were turned so that men
generally perceived a financial incentive to enter prenuptial agree-
ments, the number of such agreements might increase. This possi-
bility suggests the need for expanded efforts to protect wives who
are culturally disadvantaged in negotiations with men, a task best
left to subsequent discourse.
b) Long-term effects. Protecting caretakers today exacts
no future toll. To the contrary, a contemporary partnership model
supposes and encourages positive concepts of marital sharing,
equality of right and responsibility, and thus more fluid roles be-
tween the sexes. Moreover, a gradual relaxation of the sex/gender
system in the home ultimately may be duplicated in the market-
place, which has long reflected and exacerbated that system. To
the extent, for example, that a wife and husband share caretaking
responsibilities, the wife can increase her attachment to the mar-
ketplace and thus possibly her choices and opportunities for ad-
vancement. Ultimately, equalizing the employment investments of
women and men may erode the stereotyped division of labor in the
marketplace.
Such visions, however, may be only wishful thinking. Perhaps
a contemporary partnership model for marriage will have no effect
whatsoever on the long-entrenched sex/gender system in either the
private or the public sphere. But perhaps it is more than enough to
hope that such a model will halt the financial exploitation of care-
takers under no-fault.
' While it is also possible that a man might be dissuaded from marrying a home-
maker, this result is less likely since the decision to marry is often a romantic rather than a
pragmatic one. This man could, of course, attempt to protect himself by encouraging his
spouse to work outside the home.
27 An implicit criticism of prenuptial agreements has been lodged by commentators
who question the ability of women in general to bargain with men in view of cultural factors
that encourage a conciliatory posture in women and an aggressive posture in men. See Mary
Pat Treuthart and Laurie Woods, Mediation-A Guide for Advocates and Attorneys Rep-
resenting Battered Women 13-14, 75 (1990). Premarital agreements have also been criti-
cized in view of the fluctuating nature of the marital relationship and the failure of many
spouses to amend their contracts to reflect shifting attitudes. See Prager, Shifting Perspec-
tives at 123 (cited in note 43).
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IV. PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Simple justice requires that a dissociated homemaker receive a
buyout of her interest in any continuing marital enterprise. Legis-
lation can ensure this buyout most expediently by providing more
precise rules and more predictable results than those obtainable
through judicial reform. This legislation should establish bright-
line rules that include a presumptive method for calculating a
buyout and limit trial court discretion to apply those rules in a
gender-biased fashion s.2 8
A. Maintenance as Buyout
As previously explained, the right to a buyout depends upon
identifying a marital enterprise that continues after dissociation.28 9
Such an enterprise continues when either or both spouses generate
post-divorce income that is attributable to marital investments.
While the concept of dissociation from an ongoing enterprise can
identify cases in which a buyout is appropriate, it does not quan-
tify the appropriate amount of a buyout. A wide array of formulae
are possible to fix this amount.29 0 I offer a model based on a simple
28 Valuation on a case-by-case basis could be an expensive task. Professor O'Connell
criticizes human capital theory on the ground that quantification "will require expensive
expert testimony, a cost which even upper-middle-class wives find difficult to underwrite."
O'Connell, 23 New England L Rev at 503 (cited in note 31).
289 See text accompanying notes 264-82. The buyout right should not depend, of course,
on which spouse seeks dissociation if the spirit of no-fault is to be preserved. The question
of whether a buyout should be denied a spouse guilty of marital fault is beyond the scope of
this Article, though one might reasonably suppose that an investment over time in the
human capital of a spouse would occur regardless of that spouse's marital fidelity or infidel-
ity. Some states, however, deny maintenance to a "guilty" spouse. See Freed and Walker, 24
Family L Q at 355-56 (cited in note 110).
290 A buyout could be measured by the cost of the investment in human capital, such as
sums actually contributed to tuition and the lost opportunities of the contributing spouse.
See Combs, 2 J Divorce at 341-54 (cited in note 211) (suggesting measurement of both lost
opportunities and amount of investment). Such a method of measurement, which focuses on
reliance rather than expectation, is troublesome on several counts. First, in many cases, the
actual funds contributed to a spouse's education may be insignificant when compared to the
return realized on this investment, and thus may seriously undercompensate a dissociated
spouse. Second, if contributions include homemaking services, difficult valuation problems
arise in the effort to put a market price tag on such personal services as chauffeuring chil-
dren to school events, attending school meetings, and providing emotional and spiritual sup-
port and security. Third, measurement based on lost opportunity is troublesome because it
entails a dubious inquiry into "what-ifs" and an equally dubious focus on a spouse as victim
rather than investor. See text accompanying note 210. Finally, a focus on the wife's "sacri-
fice" is inconsistent with the parties' expectations. The family decision to invest primarily or
exclusively in the husband's human capital, for example, was likely made with the expecta-
tion that the family would enjoy a return on that investment. If the marriage contract ends
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mathematical calculation of enhanced earnings. This model is not
intended as a fait accompli, but rather as a springboard to discus-
sion and, I hope, to much-needed legislative reform.
B. An Enhanced Earnings Model
The proposed model values a continuing marital enterprise by
measuring the spouses' enhanced ability to generate income. 91 In
drafting this model, I have opted for simplicity and the limitation
of variables whenever possible to provide a framework that maxi-
mizes predictability and minimizes costs for the parties.
1. Valuing the enterprise.
The value of a continuing marital enterprise should be fixed at
the time of dissociation. This valuation will define all the parties'
rights and obligations, thus providing the psychological and finan-
cial-planning benefits of a clean break.9 2
Recent drafts of the RUPA suggest that a continuing business
should be valued by measuring "the greater of liquidation value or
value based on a sale of the entire business as a going concern
without the dissociated partner."293 Liquidation value is the
amount of revenue partnership assets would generate at a fire
sale-that is, if the business were closed down and its assets sold.
In the case of marriage, liquidation value would measure the value
of traditional marital property, which is ordinarily distributed as
part of the property award. Such property might include automo-
biles, bank accounts, jewelry, and equity in the marital home.
Often, it is a small sum.2 94
Liquidation value, however, is an unsatisfactory measure of
the value of a business where liquidation is not contemplated, be-
cause value in such cases consists in the ability to generate income
rather than the value of liquidated assets. Liquidation value is
therefore an unsatisfactory measure of the value of a continuing
marital enterprise, which lies in human capital rather than liquida-
tible assets. Thus, the best method for valuing a marital enterprise
measures its value as a going concern. This process requires two
prematurely, the wife should receive the benefit of the bargain, which is a share of the hus-
band's enhanced earnings, not compensation for the depreciation of her own human capital.
") This model builds on the work of other human capital theorists. See note 211.
See RUPA § 701(b) (determining buyout price as of time of event causing
dissociation).
Id.
"4 See text accompanying notes 85-107.
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steps: (1) estimating the parties' future earnings, and (2) measur-
ing enhancement, the part of those future earnings attributable to
marital investments.
a) Estimating future earnings. One well-established
method for estimating a future stream of earnings simply averages
net income over a prior period: for example, over five consecutive
years.2 95 Although a more sophisticated estimate is possible,
296
averaging would provide a simple and inexpensive estimate of in-
come in the ordinary case. 97
The extraordinary case could be addressed by creating a legis-
lative presumption favoring estimation through averaging, thus
placing the burden on a spouse disputing this measure to offer a
more accurate estimate. An extraordinary case might arise, for ex-
ample, if a spouse pursued a professional degree during the mar-
riage and obtained that degree immediately before dissociation, so
that enhanced income had not yet been recognized from what was
clearly a marital investment. In such a case, future earnings might
have to be based on the average earnings of other persons with
similar degrees.298
Future earnings would thus presumptively be measured at the
time of dissociation using the following formula:
For each spouse,
EAD = Estimated Earnings At Dissociation
295 See Hamilton, Fundamentals § 11.5.1 at 235-37 (cited in note 242). Fringe benefits,
such as health insurance, probably should be included in income. While inclusion of these
benefits might make the valuation process more difficult, their exclusion would tend to pro-
duce a distorted estimate of actual income.
296 Future payments might also be estimated by more heavily weighting the most cur-
rent years. See Burke and Rosen, Valuing Educational Attainment at 66 (cited in note 98).
Alternatively, payments might be estimated by using a "decision tree," in which probabili-
ties are assigned to likely cash-flow outcomes and all possible results are weighted. See
Hamilton, Fundamentals § 11.5.1 at 237 (cited in note 242).
297 Prior income could easily be established through old tax returns, which can be ob-
tained by using IRS Form 4506. In the case of a self-employed person whose tax return
suggests negative income, further inquiry might be appropriate to evaluate actual cash flow
from the business by taking into account nonbusiness and noncash expenses such as
depreciation.
298 This was, in fact, what occurred in O'Brien, where the trial court estimated future
earnings based on the income of an average surgeon. 489 NE2d at 714. See also Combs, 2 J
Divorce at 345-46 (cited in note 211) (suggesting this method of estimation for marriages of
short duration); and Renick, Spousal Contribution to a Professional Degree Upon Divorce
at 63-65 (cited in note 97). The speculative nature of this valuation suggests that the buyout
order should be modifiable upon a showing of changed circumstances. See text accompany-
ing notes 311-14.
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(average annual net income 99 for the shorter of (1) five con-
secutive one-year periods prior to dissociation or (2) each year
of marriage)
Once future earnings are estimated, this figure must be reduced to
reflect only those earnings attributable to marital investment.
b) Measuring enhancement. A buyout is not a windfall
for the spouse who catches a rich mate. Rather, it is a return on an
investment. Thus, the value of the marital enterprise should reflect
only the enhancement in human capital that results from marital
investment.300 Especially where the spouses marry later in life, pos-
sibly not for the first time, it is important to establish the date of
marriage as a baseline. Although it is not possible to measure en-
hancement with absolute precision, enhanced earnings could be es-
timated using the following formula:
For each spouse,
EAM = Estimated Earnings At Marriage (current dollars)301
29 Federal, state, and local taxes and social security taxes, which are nondiscretionary
income, should be deducted from gross income to calculate net income.
300 Native talent, personal ambition, and circumstance may, of course, greatly impact
enhancement. A husband's success as a rocket scientist, for example, may stem largely from
his genius; a wife's more limited success as a corporate executive may stem largely from
discrimination against women within her organization. These realities, however, do not es-
tablish that enhanced earnings do not flow from marital investment. Rather, they merely
define the qualities and life circumstances of the person in whom the investment is made.
It is, however, somewhat of a fiction to say that an enhancement in human capital dur-
ing marriage is strictly a product of investments made during the marriage. Investments in
human capital occur over a lifetime, and it may well be that an investment made very early
in life and well before marriage will not yield a return until sometime during marriage. See
Parkman, 40 Ark L Rev at 446 (cited in note 211). Professor Parkman's solution to this
problem is to treat human capital as marital property only when the investment during
marriage is "substantial," and only when the investment would not have occurred without
the support of the spouse. Id at 448, 460, 465.
To take an easy example, a largely pre-marital investment yields a return during mar-
riage when a woman marries a student in his last year of medical training. If this couple
divorces after the husband's first year of medical practice, the wife might claim a huge
buyout based on her husband's enhancement in human capital that occurred during mar-
riage but that is largely attributable to a pre-marital investment. This situation could be
easily addressed, however, by adopting a sliding scale buyout share based on the length of
the marriage. If the marriage lasted only one year, for example, the wife might claim only
3% of her husband's enhanced earnings. See note 309 and accompanying text. This solution
would address the problem without requiring a difficult and speculative inquiry into the
likelihood that the husband would have made the same investment had the parties not
married.
301 Payments at marriage should be measured in dollars at the time of dissociation.
This could easily be done by reference to the Consumer Price Index. See Combs, 2 J Divorce
at 345 (cited in note 211).
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(average annual net income for the shorter of (1) five consecu-
tive one-year periods prior to marriage or (2) each year of em-
ployment prior to marriage)30 2
EAD - EAM = E (annual enhanced earnings)
This formula will produce an estimate of the annual earnings
after dissociation attributable to investments made during mar-
303riage. The spouses' combined ability to generate enhanced earn-
ings constitutes the value of the marital enterprise. This value
could be reduced to a lump sum at the time of dissociation by: (1)
fixing the number of periods over which enhanced earnings are
measured,0 4 (2) multiplying this number of periods by annual en-
Using the date of marriage as a baseline, however, may encourage marriages post-gradu-
ation because, at least from a financial perspective, it would verge on the irrational for a
student to marry a year or two short of graduation. While it is true that this baseline might
discourage marriage by a student, an earlier, pre-marital baseline would be subject to the
conceptual objection that it gives a spouse a return not traceable to a marital investment.
The concerned student could, of course, protect his financial interests by entering a prenup-
tial agreement.
302 If a spouse was not employed at any time during the five years before marriage,
income could be attributed to that spouse by using the figure for minimum wage, full-time
employment at the time. If a spouse worked only part-time before marriage, annual income
would be full-time employment at the same rate. Alternatively, wages for an unemployed or
underemployed spouse might be estimated through expert evaluation of the wages that
could have been earned if that spouse had worked full-time.
Elizabeth Beninger and Jeanne Smith suggest the latter approach. See Beninger and
Smith, 16 Family L Q at 215 (cited in note 211). But the added cost and decreased predict-
ability that such a method would generate suggest that its use should be limited. This limi-
tation could be effected by creating a rebuttable presumption that full-time minimum wage
income should be attributed to a spouse who was unemployed for the five years preceding
the marriage. The spouse dissatisfied with this measure would have an opportunity to estab-
lish a better estimate.
303 This formula will not, however, measure enhancements in human capital that occur
after dissociation, but that are attributable to investments made during marriage. Such a
delayed enhancement would occur, for example, in the student/non-student marriage that
ends abruptly upon the student's graduation. This extraordinary case, however, is best ad-
dressed through the estimate of future earnings, which might increase the amount of
"EAD." See notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
3" Fixing a lump sum requires that the number of periods be defined, because earnings
will not continue indefinitely. One simple way to number future payments would be to ex-
tend them until the presumptive retirement age of the paying spouse (for example, age 65).
Alternatively, the number of periods could reflect the life expectancy of a spouse, as esti-
mated using mortality tables. While a paying spouse will not in every case continue to gen-
erate enhanced income until retirement age, this timetable would offer a simple, predictable,
and litigation-free limit on the number of periods.
Another alternative would be to define the period by the length of the marriage. This
limit would address the case of a spouse who, after dissociating from a brief marriage, might
otherwise receive a buyout reflecting enhanced income for the life of the paying spouse. As a
practical matter, however, enhancement realized from a short-term marriage is likely to be
minimal since the investment period is minimal. In the extraordinary case in which a
[60:67
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hanced earnings, and (3) discounting the resulting sum to present
value.30 5 Although it is important to value the marital enterprise at
the time of dissociation, it is not essential to calculate a lump-sum
figure, because one might expect that in most cases a buyout will
be paid as income is earned.306 Indeed, periodic payments would be
the most accurate, least distortive, and perhaps only feasible op-
tion for a paying spouse, though he should be given the option of a
lump-sum buyout.3 0 7
Once the marital enterprise is valued, it will in many cases be-
come apparent that one spouse leaves the marriage with a greater
share of that enterprise than the other spouse. In such cases, the
spouse who takes the smaller share should receive a buyout.30°
2. Fixing the buyout price.
If the spouses fail to fix their respective interests in the mari-
tal enterprise through a valid prenuptial agreement, equality rhet-
oric suggests that each spouse should presumptively take a one-
half interest. Under this approach, a dissociated spouse would take
spouse's income is greatly enhanced over the duration of a short-term marriage, concern
that a dissociated spouse might reap an unreasonably large return might better be ad-
dressed by limiting the buyout share.
305 See Hamilton, Fundamentals § 11.5 at 234 (cited in note 242), for an explanation of
present value calculations. See also Burke and Rosen, Valuing Educational Attainment at
69-70 (cited in note 98).
806 An order for periodic payments should also contain some method for ensuring pay-
ment, perhaps by requiring payments through the IRS. This issue, however, must be left for
another time.
307 A paying spouse might elect a lump-sum buyout because he seeks the clean break
this option would afford.
808 This enhanced-earnings formula will not necessarily require the higher wage earner
to buy out the interest of the other spouse, and one can imagine a scenario in which the
opposite result occurs. Consider a wife whose annual earnings during the marriage increased
from $15,000 to $35,000 and a husband whose earnings increased from $80,000 to $85,000.
Because the wife takes a larger share of the enhanced earnings, she must buy out her
higher-earning husband. While this result may seem counterintuitive, it is a fair application
of the principle that maintenance is an investment return rather than a need-based entitle-
ment. The logic that one who makes a good bargain is entitled to its reward is no less
compelling where the lower-wage-earner increases earnings more than the higher-wage-
earner.
While this scenario may rarely materialize, one could avoid its harshness on the lower-
wage-earner in two ways. The first is by establishing a presumption that the spouse with the
lower EAD need not buy out the other spouse's interest. The second is by establishing a
presumption that "catching-up is free" so that only enhanced earnings that exceed the other
spouse's earnings at the time of marriage would be subject to buyout. If, for example, the
wife's earnings increased during the marriage from $15,000 to $90,000, and the husband's
increased from $80,000 to $95,000, only the wife's excess enhanced earnings of $10,000
($90,000 - $80,000) would be subject to buyout.
19931
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fifty percent of the marital enterprise, and any disparity in en-
hanced earnings should be equalized to achieve this result. Such a
simple approach, however, takes no account of the length of the
marriage, a factor which roughly reflects the extent of a spouse's
investment. The length of the marriage, for example, defines the
period over which a caretaking spouse contributed her services,
perhaps of a unique and indispensable nature, to the marital unit.
Moreover, the duration of the marriage for a homemaker can be
expected to correlate directly with her opportunity costs.
A sound approach would be to adopt a sliding-scale buyout
percentage based on the length of the marriage. Such a scale might
be modeled after the Uniform Probate Code ("UPC"), which bases
a spouse's elective share of an augmented estate on the length of
the marriage.30 9 Interestingly, the drafters of this sliding-scale per-
centage, added in 1990, label it "the first step in the overall plan of
implementing a partnership or marital-sharing theory of marriage,
with a support theory back-up." 310 Using the UPC as a model, a
spouse who dissociated from a marriage of fifteen years or more
would receive fifty percent of any disparity in enhanced earnings.
A spouse who dissociated from a ten-year marriage would receive
thirty percent of any such disparity, and a spouse who dissociated
from a five-year marriage Would receive fifteen percent of any such
disparity. The amount of a buyout could then be easily calculated
using the following formula:
"' See Uniform Probate Code § 2-201, 8 ULA 88-89 (West 1983 & Supp 1992), which
establishes the following sliding scale:
If the decedent
and the spouse were The elective-share
married to each other: percentage is:
Less than 1 yr ...................................... Supplemental Amount Only
1 yr. but less than 2 yr ................................ 3% of augmented estate
2 yr. but less than 3 yr ........ .................. 6% of augmented estate
3 yr. but less than 4 yr ................................ 9% of augmented estate
4 yr. but less than 5 yr ............................... 12% of augmented estate
5 yr. but less than 6 yr ............................... 15% of augmented estate
6 yr. but less than 7 yr .............................. 18% of augmented estate
7 yr. but less than 8 yr .............................. 21% of augmented estate
8 yr. but less than 9 yr .............................. 24% of augmented estate
9 yr. but less than 10 yr ............................... 27% of augmented estate
10 yr. but less than 11 yr ............................... 30% of augmented estate
11 yr. but less than 12 yr ............................... 34% of augmented estate
12 yr. but less than 13 yr .............................. 38% of augmented estate
13 yr. but less than 14 yr .............................. 42% of augmented estate
14 yr. but less than 15 yr ............................... 46% of augmented estate
15 yr. or more ........................................ 50% of augmented estate
Id at 89 (Comment).
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Where,
D = Disparity in enhanced earnings
BS = Buyout Share (a percentage based on the length of the
marriage)
D X BS = Buyout
Thus, if the husband's net enhanced earnings were $100,000, the
wife's net enhanced earnings were $50,000, and the Buyout Share
were fifty percent (marriage of fifteen years or more), the wife's
buyout would be:
D = $100,000 - $50,000 = $50,000
BS = .50
B = $50,000 X .50 = $25,000
This wife would receive a buyout of $25,000 per year.
3. Modifying a buyout.
The valuation of the marital enterprise, which forms the basis
of a buyout, focuses on the spouses' abilities to generate an en-
hanced stream of payments. This focus resembles the traditional
focus of a maintenance award and raises similar problems of pre-
dictability. Because it is impossible to predict a future stream of
enhanced earnings with absolute certainty, equity requires that a
buyout be modifiable upon a substantial change in circumstance 3 1
such as the paying spouse's death, 12 retirement,31 3 or loss of em-
ployment. The loss of income resulting from such factors is a risk
assumed to some extent by any investor. If any of these circum-
stances occurs, reducing or eliminating buyout installments might
311 See, for example, UMDA § 316(a), 9A ULA 489-90 (West 1987), providing that
maintenance may be modified "only as to installments accruing subsequent to the motion
for modification and only upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and con-
tinuing as to make the terms unconscionable."
32" The likelihood that a paying spouse will die at a specified time might, of course, be
factored into the definition of the number of periods by using actuarial tables. See Renick,
Spousal Contribution at 63 (cited in note 97). For a discussion defining the number of peri-
ods, see note 304.
"' The possibility that a spouse might seek early retirement simply to avoid buyout
payments raises legitimate concern. On the other hand, to require a spouse to continue
buyout payments despite early retirement might well spark cries of human bondage. One
way to accommodate these competing concerns might be to require a retiring spouse to pay
the dissociated spouse a percentage of pension benefits reflecting the buyout share. Thus, a
spouse who was paying 50% of the disparity in enhanced earnings as a buyout might begin
to pay 50% of enhanced pension benefits upon early retirement as part of the division of
property.
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be appropriate. In any case in which a change in circumstance trig-
gers distribution of pension benefits to the paying spouse, the re-
ceiving spouse should share in these enhanced benefits, though the
amount of buyout payments will likely be reduced to reflect the
reduced income.3 14
An increase in the income of a paying spouse after dissocia-
tion, however, should not trigger an increase in the buyout, which,
in the ordinary case, is measured by enhancement in human capi-
tal that accrues during marriage and not after dissociation. While
in some cases increased income after divorce is actually a delayed
return on a marital investment, the likely difficulty of establishing
this connection, together with the need for finality, counsel against
opening the door to upward modification. Of course, when a
delayed return on marital investments is foreseen at the time of
dissociation, it may be factored into the estimate of future
earnings.3 15
Neither should the remarriage of a receiving spouse trigger a
modification. 16 A buyout represents a return on an investment,
not aid to the needy. It would be ludicrous to contend that a com-
mercial partner should receive a reduced buyout because she is fi-
nancially secure. It is equally ludicrous to make this argument in
the case of a marital enterprise.
Buyout installments might also cease upon the death of the
receiving spouse.3 17 While termination on this ground might seem
inconsistent with the earned-investment nature of a buyout, it may
be necessary to ensure that buyouts are characterized as mainte-
nance rather than property for income tax and bankruptcy
purposes. 3 8
'" The distribution of pension benefits as part of the division of marital property
should be coordinated with the buyout. For a recent review of the valuation and distribution
of pension benefits upon dissociation, see generally Note, 88 Colum L Rev at 194 (cited in
note 90). For an analytical framework, see generally Blumberg, 33 UCLA L Rev at 1250
(cited in note 90).
See text accompanying notes 295-99.
318 But see UMDA § 316(b), 9A ULA 490 (West 1987) ("Unless otherwise agreed in
writing or expressly provided in the decree, the obligation to pay future maintenance is
terminated upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the party receiving
maintenance.").
See id.
318 Maintenance payments are included in the gross income of the recipient and de-
ducted from the income of the payor. See Internal Revenue Code, 28 USC §§ 71, 215. It may
be in the best interest of the receiving spouse to characterize a buyout as maintenance,
because a paying spouse cannot discharge a maintenance obligation in bankruptcy, but can
discharge a property order.
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CONCLUSION
For too long, no-fault divorce laws have served as a "handy
vehicle for the summary disposal of old and used wives." 319 No-
fault laws that authorize divorce at will place all women who as-
sume primary caretaking responsibilities in jeopardy. No-fault mis-
takenly assumes that the division of property and little, if any,
maintenance will afford equity to these women. The broad discre-
tion given trial courts exacerbates this mistake, by inviting unreal-
istic and gender-biased views of a homemaker's opportunities for
rehabilitation and self-support. Divorce has thus become an eco-
nomic catastrophe for homemakers.
Often attributing this disaster to no-fault's partnership model
of marriage, concerned legal scholars have searched for a better
model of marriage that will provide a basis for maintenance. While
their efforts have laid important groundwork, none has identified a
model that provides a satisfactory basis for maintenance in the or-
dinary case of a wife whose role as primary caretaker limits her
career options and advancement, and thus reduces her post-di-
vorce income.
In this Article, I advocate a new model of marriage based on
contemporary partnership law. Under this model, divorce occurs
when a spouse dissociates from the marriage before expiration of
the term. Dissociation ends the relationship, but it does not usu-
ally end the spouses' shared enterprise, which continues to gener-
ate income in the hands of one or both spouses. The spouse who
takes the smaller portion of the marital enterprise-that is, the
spouse who earns less-should receive a buyout. Most often, this
buyout rule will require a husband to pay maintenance to a wife
who served as primary caretaker. To implement a buyout rule, I
offer a simple mathematical model for legislative reform that limits
trial court discretion. It is my hope that this effort will help to halt
the financial exploitation of caretakers under no-fault, and so con-
tribute to the effort of the American Law Institute to formulate a
set of principles that brings integrity to the law of divorce.
" Branter, 136 Cal Rptr at 637.
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